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Abstract This is part I of a two-part essay introducing case-intensional first order
logic (CIFOL), an easy-to-use, uniform, powerful, and useful combination of first-
order logic with modal logic resulting from philosophical and technical modifications
of Bressan’s General interpreted modal calculus (Yale University Press 1972).
CIFOL starts with a set of cases; each expression has an extension in each case and an
intension, which is the function from the cases to the respective case-relative exten-
sions. Predication is intensional; identity is extensional. Definite descriptions are
context-independent terms, and lambda-predicates and -operators can be introduced
without constraints. These logical resources allow one to define, within CIFOL,
important properties of properties, viz., extensionality (whether the property applies,
depends only on an extension in one case) and absoluteness, Bressan’s chief innova-
tion that allows tracing an individual across cases without recourse to any notion of
“rigid designation” or “trans-world identity.” Thereby CIFOL abstains from incorpo-
rating any metaphysical principles into the quantificational machinery, unlike extant
frameworks of quantified modal logic. We claim that this neutrality makes CIFOL
a useful tool for discussing both metaphysical and scientific arguments involving
modality and quantification, and we illustrate by discussing in diagrammatic detail
a number of such arguments involving the extensional identification of individuals
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via absolute (substance) properties, essential properties, de re vs. de dicto, and the
results of possible tests.
Keywords Modal logic · Quantification · Sortal · Tracing · Substance
1 Introduction
This is Part I of a two-part essay. We present CIFOL, an (1) easy-to-use, (2) uniform,
(3) powerful, and (4) useful combination of first-order logic with modal logic result-
ing from philosophical and technical modifications of Bressan’s monograph [6]. Such
an intensional first-order logic, or quantified modal logic, must be able to represent
facts about the identity and distinctness of things in different possible circumstances
or, as we will say, possible cases.1 One way or the other, this may bring with it a
distinction between the extension of an expression in a case, and its intension as the
pattern of extensions across cases.2 The crucial question is how this distinction can
be made productive. There are many systems of quantified modal logic out there,
each with its own virtues, but in our view none of them exhibits easiness of use, uni-
formity, expressive power, and usefulness in the precise way that we will motivate
and indeed implement in our proposed system of case-intensional first order logic,
CIFOL. As we noted, CIFOL is a modification of [6]. There Bressan, a theoretical
physicist, presents the system MLν , which in turn is a profound deepening of the
“method of extension and intension” of [10]. His purpose was to devise a quantified
modal logic not in the interests of either metaphysics or the philosophy of language,
but rather to help with understanding some aspects of scientific theory. His touch-
stone was Mach’s well-known but murky definition of “mass” in terms of possible
experiments. We think that among Bressan’s many innovations, his introduction of
modal separation (Definition 17) stands out as a testament to his originality: No other
work in quantified modal logic even hints at this fundamental concept.
Bressan’s system is both ν-sorted and higher order. CIFOL is first order, not
because we think the first order is of paramount logical interest, but merely because
ascending to higher types is unavoidably complex when everything is spelled out. Just
to begin, one has to keep track of four kinds of type entities: the types themselves,
typed expressions, typed domains of extensions, and typed domains of intensions.
For a summary description of MLν , see [3]. It is a scandal that Bressan’s brilliant
work has been almost universally ignored for forty years.
1.1 Four Logical Virtues
We begin with the first of the four qualities numbered above. (1) For a first-order
intensional logic, by easiness of use we mean (only) that a system relies chiefly
1We consistently use “thing” not in a wide sense, but rather for a “proper” thing, a resident of our concrete
world of which it makes sense to say that it exists in different cases or at different times.
2Warning: Although philosophers often use “intension” to connote meaning and “extension” to connote
reference, we do not, as we soon explain.
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on procedures familiar from first-order and modal logic. CIFOL makes two large
exceptions: (a) To the minimal syntax, CIFOL adds a Frege-inspired singular term,
“∗,” to mark nonexistence such as occasioned by failed definite descriptions; and
(b) CIFOL subtracts the general replacement property from the usual logic of identity,
while retaining the replacement property for necessary identity. CIFOL has nearly
the full power of first-order quantification—including unrestricted instantiation and
generalization principles and unrestricted λ-conversion and context-free formation
of definite descriptions ( ι-terms)—combined with S5 modal logic. This combination
of modality and quantification stands in contrast to almost every other extant quan-
tified modal logic. On the other hand, the primitive syntax of CIFOL has no “extra”
features that go beyond first order logic and S5. It is nevertheless natural to suppose
that the quantificational and modal features of CIFOL working in combination go
beyond what either can accomplish alone. From a semantic point of view, of principal
significance will be quantification over intensions and non-extensional predication.
(2) By uniformity we intend (only) a requirement on the treatment of terms and
predicates, both syntactically and semantically. There are certainly good linguistic,
metaphysical or scientific reasons for treating some terms or predicates differently
than others (e.g., for having a separate category of proper names, or of sortal or
extensional predicates). These reasons seem, however, to be extra-logical: Logic is
supposed to be formal in the sense of subject-neutral. Logical regimentation at this
juncture means running the risk of artificially narrowing down the range of what can
be expressed, and thus, in the end, of constraining empirical and conceptual work.
A first-order intensional logic uniform in our somewhat restricted sense has just one
syntactical category of terms, and one syntactical category of predicates, with a uni-
form semantic clause characterizing the application of a predicate to a term (or to
several terms, for a many-place predicate). CIFOL lives up to this ideal (except for its
treatment of the identity predicate itself) including the treatment of definite descrip-
tions as categorematic terms. Nearly all extant systems of quantified modal logic need
to have recourse to special features of some syntactically identified class of terms,
for example, by treating proper names and variables as so-called “rigid designators”
that alone allow one to trace an individual across cases as a matter of logic, since
their intension is forced to be constant across all cases, while other terms are not so
constrained. This amounts to a breach of uniformity of the kind we have in mind, and
to making the various ways of tracing individuals, which is an empirical, scientific
matter, a matter of logic. It is a scientific discovery that a common frog can be traced
as one living organism from spawn to tadpole to frog under the sortal term, “common
frog” (rana temporaria), no matter whether you give the beast a name or not, nor how
you identify it in a given case. CIFOL leaves terms and predicates unconstrained by
logic in the name of logical uniformity.
Of course our requirement of uniformity runs against another person’s felt need
of a complex syntax. For example, it would make no sense for Gupta, in his book
titled The logic of common nouns [18], to avoid introducing a formal representation
of common nouns along side of predicates and singular terms. It is not a question of
taste, but of purpose.
(3) CIFOL is expressively powerful in certain ways found only in case-intensional
systems with non-extensional predication, a category that includes, aside from
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CIFOL, only Bressan’s MLν and Montague’s IL.3 Only these systems seem to have
the power to define, in the language itself, what it means to be able to trace an
individual from one case to another. The source of this extra power comes partly
through quantification over intensions and partly through allowing and exploiting
non-extensional predication. These expressive features allow CIFOL to offer a def-
initional interface with which to introduce sortal (tracing) predicates—the so-called
“absolute” predicates—and “extensional” (qualitative) predicates via non-logical
axioms as in Section 4 below.
(4) Finally and above all, a logic worth its salt ought to be useful, in the sense of
being able to represent everyday and (especially) scientific scenarios and of giving
some guidance to the perplexed.4 Consider, for example, the following “horse story”:
There is a paddock outside; the occupant of the paddock is Andy, a brown stallion
(male horse). An hour later, Andy has been moved into the barn, and the occupant of
the paddock is now Daisy, a grey mare (female horse). Andy could, however, have
been left in the paddock as well, in which case there would be two horses in the pad-
dock. It is perfectly easy to picture what’s going on; a child can do it. It is, however,
difficult to give a perspicuous formal representation of the situation. The hard bit
is to come up with a good account of what the terms in the story, “Andy,” “Daisy”
and “the occupant of the paddock,” stand for and how the predicative expressions,
“brown,” “grey,” “male,” “female” and “horse,” function to combine with the terms to
form propositions that are true or false, as the case may be. Specifically, a major chal-
lenge is to explain how certain terms (e.g., “Daisy”) allow one to trace an individual
(a horse) through the various cases and sustain the ascription of essential proper-
ties (e.g., being female), while other terms (e.g., “the occupant of the paddock”) are
unfit for these purposes. Most quantified modal logics, if they can handle the exam-
ple at all, fail to illuminate the notion of tracing. (We essay to meet the challenge in
Section 5.) For a second example, consider that only Bressan touches on the problem
of literally “possible measurements,” nearly all of which never get made but which
must always give the same results if there is to be a stable concept of what is mea-
sured. (See Section 5.5.) We don’t know of another case in which a quantified modal
logic has been applied to generating rigorous scientific arguments.
1.2 Semantics: Preliminary Informal Discussion
Following Bressan, CIFOL takes the notion of a possible case as the basis for modal
semantics. Possibility is truth in a case; necessity is truth in all cases. No metaphysical
assumptions about the structure of the cases are made beforehand. Specifically, cases
are not taken to be “worlds” with an internal temporal structure; the cases themselves
can be taken to be temporal if that is useful in an application. Bressan applies with
3 Montague introduced his full system of intensional logic, now commonly referred to as IL, in [25]. While
he did not exercise the system’s power (his application was to a fragment of ordinary English), later work
[14] does so, making it clear that IL can do anything that MLν can do. For similarly powerful systems, see
also [12, 33]. Gupta [18, Ch. 3.4], also considers a first-order version of MLν .
4There are of course other notable uses of modal logic; for instance, clarifying metaphysical doctrines,
and analyzing natural-language constructions. Bressan [6] touches on these matters.
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full generality the method of extension and intension introduced in a limited way in
[10]: Extension is always extension-in-a-case, and every expression has an extension
in each case and an intension, which is the pattern of extensions across cases. Both
extensions and intensions are therefore thoroughly objective: In contrast to standard
philosophical usage, intensions are not taken to be analytic of meanings, nor indeed
to be always of a kind that a human mind can grasp. All individual terms, including
variables, constants and definite descriptions, are handled uniformly. Semantically,
there is a “domain,” introduced in Section 2.3, that harbors the extensions of individ-
ual terms, but take care right from the beginning: Members of “the domain” need not
be construed as individuals. Rather, in certain typical applications it is the intensions
of certain individual terms that correspond to concrete individuals. To lose sight of
this feature of CIFOL is entirely to misconstrue our enterprise. It follows that it is
wrong to think of intension vs. extension as rather like Frege’s sense and denota-
tion; even the grammar is unlike, since an extension is always extension-in-a-case.
Partly for this reason, we altogether avoid the semantic word “reference” (sticking to
extension/intension), but it may help to observe that if we were to use it, reference in
CIFOL would be to intensions.
Predication and quantification are intensional: Variables, like all other terms, have
an intension, and an extension in each case. Furthermore, in a profoundly significant
departure from almost every other quantified modal logic known to us, whether a
predicate (other than the identity predicate) applies to a sequence of terms in a case,
may depend not just on the extensions of the terms in that case, but on their inten-
sions (“non-extensional predication”). No restrictions are placed on the (intensional)
values of the variables, so that instantiation and λ-abstraction are allowed with full
generality. Non-extensional predication allows for and is required by the definitional
(logical rather than syntactical) characterizations of extensional and absolute prop-
erties given in Section 4. We count these definitions as part of CIFOL. In contrast,
axioms declaring a particular predicate as extensional or absolute are an extra-logical
part of an application. Absolute properties have the intensional features of sortal
properties, so they can be employed to trace an object between cases. As such, it is
only individual intensions that fall under an absolute property that can reasonably
represent concrete individuals. In other words, in its definition of “absolute,” CIFOL
gives an account of the logical nature of the tracing of individuals between cases,
whereas whether a particular predicate is absolute is assumed to be not a matter of
logic, but rather of science and metaphysics. There is in CIFOL no recourse to “rigid
designators” nor to any notion of “trans-world identity.”5
5 Indeed, CIFOL’s minimalistic, non-metaphysical outlook on cases gives one an argument against a cat-
egory of rigid designators over and above our appeal to ease of use and uniformity: Such a syntactical
category should (we may want to suppose) work for any set of cases. But surely rigid designation in the
sense of “same extension in every case” only makes sense, if it makes sense at all, for cases = worlds;
it makes no sense for cases = times, or cases = moment/history pairs as in branching histories. In those
applications of the framework, rigidity would amount to freezing the thing in question; it couldn’t change
(supposing that the change of a thing is reflected by temporal variation in the extension of a term denoting
the thing).
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1.3 A Brief Overview of Other Systems
We briefly discuss a number of proposed systems of quantified modal logic to indi-
cate how they do not further our aims (that is, in particular, sorting out complicated
everyday reasoning and—above all—scientific modal reasoning) or fall short of our
ideals. This is meant to provide additional motivation for introducing CIFOL.6
The first steps combining first order and modal logic were made purely syntacti-
cally in [2]. Carnap [10] gives a semantics and introduces his method of extension and
intension. Cases in his system are syntactical entities, viz., “state-descriptions” that
contain “for every atomic sentence either this sentence or its negation, but not both,
and no other sentences” (p. 9). While opening the way to the method of extension
and intension, the syntactic approach severely limits both uniformity and useful-
ness. To name one striking limitation, Carnap does not allow modalities in definite
descriptions (p. 184).
Post-Carnapian systems are not based on syntactically individuated cases, but
rather on a general notion of cases, like CIFOL, or—more commonly—on possible
worlds. In [21] and others, the development of quantified modal logic has been an
area of tight contact between logic and metaphysics, in that logical features of a sys-
tem are made subservient to metaphysical views about worlds, objects, individuals,
substances, and so on. This approach has led to a proliferation of logical systems.
All of them offer means for tracing individuals across cases in the logic itself, which
restricts usefulness. As we will indicate, that approach also reduces ease of use and
uniformity. A second feature of all non-Bressanian systems is what we think of as
“extensionalism,” namely, a desire to be as extensional as possible, the traditional
ideal being first-order predicate logic. This hankering manifests itself in more than
one way, but the overwhelmingly common result of extensionalism is that it supports
the view that all predication is extensional; that is, the view that the extension (truth
value) of the result of applying a predicate to a term depends only on the extension
of the term.7 As one might put it, as a matter of extensionalist logic, all predication is
said to be extensional like the negation connective, rather than being non-extensional
like the necessity connective. No extensionalist logic has the expressive power to
illuminate the idea of tracing an individual from case to case or time to time.
Extensionalism is a natural child of first-orderism. How so? In second-order modal
logic it would indeed be quixotic to insist that all predication be extensional. Think
of the second-order property of a first-order property such as “white,” applying con-
tingently: Whether or not a first-order property, P applies contingently to Socrates
6Our aim is to be brief rather than comprehensive, both with respect to the selection of systems mentioned
and with respect to the discussion of the systems themselves. For more detailed information on many
systems of quantified modal logic, see, e.g., [13, 15, 19]. It is striking that no mainstream discussion of
quantified modal logic with the exception of [1, 18, 27] takes substantial notice of Bressan’s ideas; and as
we will make clear, even the latter two systems fall short of answering to our purposes.
7As an extra-logical matter, CIFOL describes “most” predicates as extensional, while avoiding extension-
alism by leaving room for non-extensional predication.
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clearly must depend on the intension of P (i.e., its extension in many possible cases),
not merely on its extension in a single case. Now uniformity kicks in: If predication
at higher types needs to be non-extensional, uniformity suggests that the same should
hold at lower types. It is therefore not surprising that the higher order system of [25]
allows for predicates of all types, including predicates applying to intensions. It is
also unsurprising that all quantified modal logics that ignore higher types demand
that all predication be extensional.8
The pioneering semantics of [21] (for S5) and [22] (for weaker systems, based on
a relational structure of possible worlds), endows each world with its own domain of
individuals. Extensionalism comes in twice: (1) Although constants are given inten-
sions, variables are given only extensions, which amounts to non-uniformly taking
variables, but not constants, to be rigid designators. (2) Predication is extensional,
even when its argument is a constant bearing an intension.
Extensionalism is also a driving force behind the counterpart-theoretic approach
to quantified modal logic pioneered by Lewis [23], who considers the non-
extensionality of modal logic “a historical accident” (p. 113) that can be overcome. In
Lewis’s approach, the need for a tracing principle is denied, as individuals are strictly
world-bound. Our conversational practice of tracing individuals across different cases
is catered for by a context-dependent counterpart relation between inhabitants of dif-
ferent worlds. The Lewis scheme may work well for conversations; it seems unlikely,
however, that our protean conversational practice can undergird a serious use of quan-
tified modal logic in science. Metaphysically, Lewis answers the question, whether
a thing can be present in more than one case, in the negative. CIFOL works out the
contrary position, that the person who answered the doorbell on Monday is the same
person as the one who answered on Tuesday, and that the person who is going to
answer a knock in case it’s loud is the same person who is going to answer a soft
knock. It is inconceivable that the philosophical verdict on such a basic question is
going to be unanimous. We will only maintain that all the parts of the CIFOL scheme
fit together intuitively, comfortably, and without strain or loose pieces.
Like Bressan’s MLν , the system of Montague [25] (known as IL) is both higher
order and also invites concentration on its first order fragment (see footnote 3). IL
is properly intensional in that it assigns intensions to all terms, including variables.
Nevertheless, IL treats variables and constants differently: As in [22], constants may
have non-constant intensions, but variables are rigid designators. On the other hand,
in IL, variables are available at all types, so that there are also variables ranging
over individual intensions, and we can express intensional predication. This means,
however, that the different types have to be converted explicitly in order to main-
tain well-formedness; there is a primitive intension-of operator and a corresponding
primitive extension-of operator. IL uses these in order to be able to explain the
failure of arguments such as the following: “The temperature is ninety. The tempera-
ture rises. Therefore, ninety rises.” With the (indirect) availability of non-extensional
predication, IL has resources sufficient to introduce extra-logical tracing principles;
Montague, however, does not take this step.
8Except CIFOL, which, though first order, self-consciously uses ideas from Bressan’s higher-order logic.
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We repeat: IL adds notation beyond the S5 modalities and quantification, namely,
the “intension of” operator and a companion “extension of” operator. These syntactic
additions, which seem to arise out of extensionalism, spoil ease of use and make
it more difficult to connect IL with scientific argumentation. There is, however, no
doubt that IL is equal in power to MLν in strictly mathematical terms.
Muskens [26] develops a higher-order quantified modal logic, MTT (modal type
theory), which deserves credit for cleaning up IL, partly by letting predication be
nonextensional in a sense even stronger than that available in MLν . MTT prides itself
on two features orthogonal to the concerns of CIFOL: (1) It is what we may call
“hyperintensional” in that it is suitable for epistemic and doxastic modalities as well
as possibility and necessity. (2) It admits of formulation as a cut free tableau calculus.
MTT is noticeably more complex than CIFOL without, we think, offering compa-
rable logical insight at the first order. In our opinion, its doctrine of intension and
extension, which is not at all case-intensional, is, for that reason, relatively opaque
and by so much difficult to apply.
Tichy´ [33] introduces “transparent intensional logic” (TIL), a system that bears
many similarities to IL while at the same time differing in crucial respects. TIL is
based on constructions, which allows for hyperintensionality, e.g., in belief contexts,
which CIFOL does not.9 Variables are treated as simple constructions selecting an
object from a given sequence of objects (a valuation); thus, again, first-order vari-
ables are rigid designators, with the mentioned negative effects. To be fair, [33] also
offers variables of different types, e.g., variables for intensions, but this route breaks
uniformity in the treatment of terms. Nevertheless, TIL, like IL, illuminates many
bits and pieces of English.
Williamson [36] offers a second order modal logic as a context for discussing the
“Barcan formula,” which we mention in Section 3.1.6. Based on extensional predica-
tion and an extensional treatment of quantifiers, that study concerns problems quite
different from those that arise from our first-order adaptation of MLν .
Thomason [31] discusses systems of quantified modal logic with the aim of com-
bining “modal logic and metaphysics” (so the title of the paper): “[A]s well as
shaping logical work in the light of heuristic philosophical considerations, I have
often found myself modifying metaphysical preconceptions in the light of technical
considerations” [31, 120]. Thomason considers, but rejects a system Q2 with vari-
ables for intensions (but extensional predication); his ultimate choice, in the system
Q3, is to treat variables as standing for substances and to require constant intensions
for them: again, as in so many other systems, making the tracing of individuals a
matter of logic. As before, we mention this as a salient difference rather than as a
value judgment.
Bacon [1], building on [31], aims at a first-order version of Bressan’s framework,
although in our judgment he misses the mark. Terms (including variables) have inten-
sions, and an extension in each case. Bacon adds to the grammar: He introduces a
9We believe it is still a major open question whether hyperintensionality is amenable to useful formal
treatment.
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single tracing predicate, , which is read as “subsists” or “straight,” and is meant to
single out “what is rigidly designated” (p. 193, n1). As in other cases, extensional
predication restricts the usefulness of the system, and allowing only a single tracing
predicate restricts the metaphysics of substance as a logical matter.
In contrast, Parks [27] anticipates CIFOL by offering a faithful first-order version
of [6], which Parks calls “the Bressan language.” Parks applies the Bressan language
to the question whether a class such as the Supreme Court can change its members.
Later philosophers, sadly, completely ignore this interesting paper.
Gupta [18] develops a system similar in spirit to Bressan’s. He stresses the “impor-
tant logical and semantic difference between common nouns and predicates” (p. 1)
and builds his system to reflect these differences both syntactically and semantically.
Quantifiers are of the form (∀K, x), with K a common noun, so that variables are
always variables for things of a certain kind. In this way, a tracing principle, provided
by the kind K, is built into the quantificational machinery of the logic. This fea-
ture has the advantage of nicely enhancing the fit of the formal system with English
syntax and semantics. It comes at the cost of ease of use, as well as syntactic and
semantic uniformity. The system is powerful; these features, however, seem to make
it less easy to use the system to help with clarifying technical scientific arguments.10
Fitting [12] gives a readable account of certain difficulties of the most common
frameworks of quantified modal logic, criticizing both the idea of variables as rigid
designators and the counterpart theory of [23]. Against this background he introduces
his first-order intensional logic, FOIL. As in other systems, object variables are dis-
tinguished from intension variables, thus reducing ease of use—a trade-off that we
have encountered before.
Garson [15] embarks on the laudable enterprise of unifying quantified modal logic
by starting from a minimal basis, G. G has some similarities to CIFOL: Variables
as well as other terms of G take intensions as values, and identity is case-relative.
Garson describes how a great many extensions of G, including “[w]ith one notable
exception, the major systems found in the literature,”11 can be treated uniformly with
regard to soundness and completeness. All these systems share extensional predi-
cation. Consequently, Garson’s unification excludes CIFOL and its case-intensional
cousins.
To sum up: With the exception of CIFOL, [6], and [27], quantified modal logic
has, for better or worse, been affected by (1) extensionalist tendencies and (2) the felt
need to introduce logical means for tracing individuals across cases. This has led to
10Gupta [18, Ch. 3.4], discusses the option of adopting Bressan’s approach to common nouns, acknowl-
edging its uniformity. For a thoughtful discussion and comparison of Gupta’s system with Montague’s
IL, see [34], which also documents an exchange between Montague and Dana Scott in which Montague
seems ready to adopt stages, or heaps-of-molecules-at-a-moment, as extensions in a temporal reading
of his intensional logic, similar to what we will propose in our examples (Section 5). Furthermore, Van
Leeuwen argues that such an understanding of extensions would be the most “favorable interpretation”
[34, p. 76] of Gupta [18]. Van Leeuwen thereby comes close to the CIFOL view that extensions of terms
are not individuals (see Section 2.3).
11The reference is to the expanding domain system LPC+S and its relatives defined in [19, Ch. 15].
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systems whose usefulness for certain applications is restricted since they treat extra-
logical matters as fixed by logic, and, except for IL, thereby fail to provide expressive
resources that are needed for scientific or conceptual work. The systems also pay a
price in that they do not fully live up to standards of ease of use and uniformity that
CIFOL can satisfy. On the other hand, several of the systems provide an easier and
more illuminating fit with English. We think of CIFOL as being in this respect rather
like that bedrock of logic, first-order predicate logic.
1.4 Structure of the Essay
Part I of the essay is structured as follows: We introduce the basic notions of CIFOL,
including its grammar and the general machinery of extension and intension, in
Section 2. In Section 3, we lay out the detailed semantics of CIFOL. We take two
shortcuts here: First, we explicitly describe only one-place predicates and operators;
second, we omit a lengthy discussion of the proof theory, much of which is a straight-
forward combination of standard first-order proof theory and the proof theory for S5
(modulo the CIFOL-specific treatment of identity as extensional; see Sections 3.1.5
and 3.3). For details, see [6] or, more gently, [3]. In Section 4 we discuss absolute
properties and related notions, and their uses in characterizing sortals; we illustrate
their use in Section 5. We summarize in Section 6. The separate Part II [5] continues
the discussion.
2 Basics
2.1 Grammar of CIFOL
The principal “parts of speech” in CIFOL are terms, sentences, operators, and pred-
icates, all defined by recursion on complexity, and certain connectives. Among the
atomic constants there are sentential constants, p, predicate constants, P , individual
constants, c, and operator constants, f . Among the atomic terms, there is also a set
Vars of individual variables, with x, y, z ranging over them, and there is a special
individual constant, ∗, to figure as a sign of non-existence. Individual terms, with α, β
ranging over them, arise by applying an n-ary operator (either constant or λ-operator),
η, to an n-tuple of terms: η(α1, . . . , αn). There is a distinguished two-place predicate
constant for use in case-dependent identity sentences: α1 = α2.12 Using  to range
over predicates, additional sentences come by applying an n-ary predicate (either
constant or λ-predicate), , to an n-tuple of terms: (α1, . . . , αn). Sentences arise
from these via the usual truth-functional connectives such as negation, conjunction,
disjunction, and the conditional and biconditional: ¬,∧,∨,→,↔; the modal con-
nectives  and ♦ for necessity and possibility; and the usual first-order quantifiers,
∃x and ∀x, applied to sentences. 	 ranges over sentences.
12Even though it is hard to think of identity as world dependent, taking it as case dependent is natural:
“The winner will be (identical to) Ralph in case it rains, but not in case the sun shines.”
CIFOL: Case-Intensional First Order Logic 403
CIFOL features unrestricted formation of ι-terms (definite descriptions) ιx(	), λ-
predicates λx(	), and, λ-operators λx(α).13 A definite description is an individual
term. Applying a λ-operator, λx(α) to a term, β, issues in a term, (λx(α))β. Apply-
ing a λ-predicate, λx(	), to a term, β, issues in a sentence, (λx(	))β. A λ-operator
[λ-predicate] may occur only in an operator [predicate] position (on pain of ascend-
ing past the first order). Finally, an expression, whether open or closed, is either an
operator, η, or a predicate, , or an individual term, α, or a sentence, 	; and in the
latter two cases is categorematic. We let ξ range over expressions.
2.2 Cases
In contrast to the exotic practice of quantifying over “worlds,” quantification over
cases is standard English:
– What if it rains? In any such a case, the game will be canceled; but the game will
proceed in case it doesn’t rain.
– Yes, there are cases in which Sam will agree to wash the car, but also cases in
which he won’t.
– In no case will I attend the meeting.
Partly because of their ties to conversational English, cases are less pretentious
than worlds, so that their use invites substantial increase of flexibility in applica-
tions. On the other hand, invoking a set, , of cases to help with modal thinking in
CIFOL brings along with it certain interconnected idealizing presuppositions that go
beyond the everyday meaning of “case.” (1) In any application,  is to be the set of
all possible cases; there are no others. (2) Accordingly, each case γ ∈  is elemen-
tary, which is to say, there are no subcases. (3) Put linguistically, no elementary case
harbors a contradiction, and each elementary case decides all disjunctions. Point (3)
makes it clear that there is an interaction, be it ever so slight, between postulating a
set of cases on the one hand, and the language (grammar and semantics) on the other.
(4) At this point, we have no need for “the real case” since even though many exam-
ples and modal puzzles call for it, we are not in this essay introducing an “It’s actually
true that” connective.
The set of cases might be humdrum and finite, and elementary only relative to
the conversational context. Let there be a horserace coming up next Saturday, and let
 be {γ1, γ2}, where γ1 is a case in which the track is dry, and γ2 a case in which
the track is muddy. A stable owner might ask her manager if there is a horse that
can win the race in any case. Or  might be arcane and infinite, as in Bressan’s
application of MLν to Mach’s definition of mass in terms of the ratio of consequent
relative velocities when the measured mass-point strikes the unit mass-point. In this
context, each case, γ , represents a distribution of mass-points, at a certain fixed time,
t0, with their attendant masses and velocities. Given that the to-be-measured mass-
point, here-now, does not in fact collide with the unit mass stored in Se`vres (and they
13λ-operators and -predicates in CIFOL are all one-place. One may simulate the use of binary λ-operators,
for instance, with λx1(λx2(α)β2)β1.
404 N. Belnap, T. Mu¨ller
won’t let you play with it anyway), the problem is to make sense of using, here and
now, the result of a merely possible collision.
In an application,  might or might not be structured in some way; for example,
an application to tense logic would interpret  as a linearly ordered set of intervals or
moments of time. In another application,  might be construed as the set of momen-
tary events in a branching (indeterministic) structure (branching histories). In Part
II of this essay [5], we will develop our approach with a view towards temporal-
modal cases in branching histories. In this part, however, we make no assumptions
whatsoever about the structure of the set of cases. At the present level of general-
ity all we need to know about cases is that there are some—indeed, at least two,
so as to avoid modal triviality.14 We always let  be the set of all cases, and let γ
range over . Truth and extension for closed expressions will be relativized to cases.
More fundamentally, in case-intensional semantics, every closed expression has an
extension-in-γ relative to each case, γ , and an intension that can always be repre-
sented as a function from the set, , of all cases into extensions of an appropriate
sort. To help us keep track, given sets X and Y , we use X → Y as the set of func-
tions that map X into Y . Thus, intensions will uniformly have the form  → Y , for
appropriate Y .
2.3 Extensional Domain
Having specified the cases, we need an extensional domain, D, to provide case-
dependent extensions of singular terms, and the set of truth values {T, F}, which
we abbreviate as 2, to provide case-dependent extensions of sentences of CIFOL. In
standard quantified modal logic, where the cases are thought of as separate “worlds,”
such a domain is normally thought of as containing individuals: the inhabitants of
the separate worlds. In CIFOL, however, concrete individuals are not represented by
members of D. More fundamentally, in CIFOL there are no variables that range over
D. The only function of D is to enable a case-dependent identity: We will say later
that α1 = α2 is true in a case, γ , when and only when the extensions in D of α1 in γ
and of α2 in γ are identical. CIFOL puts D to no further use. In particular, there is in
CIFOL no facility for comparing the extension of a term in one case with its exten-
sion in another, so that the idea of a term being “rigid” by having the same extension
in every case turns out to be inexpressible, which is a matter of no consequence, since
expressing rigidity would add nothing useful to the expressive powers of CIFOL. You
will see that in CIFOL the work of rigidity is accomplished via “absolute properties,”
as in Section 4 below. With these means, we will be able to say in CIFOL that the
horse that wins the race in case it rains is the same horse as the horse that wins the
race in case it doesn’t rain—or that they are not the same horse—without comparing
the extension of “the horse that wins” in the case in which it rains with the extension
of “the horse that wins” in the case in which it doesn’t rain.
14 We can’t think of a word that applies idiomatically to both modal alternatives and to times; CIFOL,
however, operates at a level of generality that treats times and alternatives alike, which is our reason for
sticking to “cases” when we are being most general.
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Thus, we assume almost no structure on D, and for simplicity, we assume that the
domain is specified independently of the cases. It is essential to observe, however,
that CIFOL is not comparable to a “constant domain” logic in the sense of standard
modal logic. The profound reason is that the individual variables of CIFOL take
values that are intensional, rather than extensional.15
There is one more thing to say about D: We have introduced ∗ as an individual
constant. Its intension must therefore be a function in  → D. Following Frege, we
assume that D contains, apart from at least one “proper” extension, a “throwaway” to
be the extension of terms, such as failed definite descriptions, that do not otherwise
have an extension in a given case. We call the throwaway “∗”. Since we let ∗ be a
term, and since we don’t care what its extension is, we may as well think of ∗ as
autonymous by giving it the extension ∗ in every case.16 The sentence “α = ∗ ”
then expresses a kind of case-dependent existence, and is to be read “α exists.” For
convenience, we define a case-dependent existence predicate, E:17
Definition 1 (Existence Predicate)
∀x[Ex ↔df x = ∗].
This case-relative existence predicate will play an important role in the discussion
of properties of properties in Section 4.
2.4 Intensions
The defining feature of case-intensional semantics is that every expression of every
type shall have both an intension and an extension-in-γ for each γ ∈ . Starting
with categorematic expressions, by an “individual intension” we mean a function in
 → D, and by a “propositional intension” a function in  → 2. It is then obvious
that in our lexicon intensions are neither linguistic nor subjective.18 We let z, in our
use-language, range over individual intensions, so that z(γ ) ∈ D. Of note is that in
case-intensional semantics, for certain predicates, , the truth value in a case γ of a
sentence, (α), may depend not just on the extension in γ of the singular term, α,
but on its intension (intensional predication).
You should expect that concrete individuals are represented in CIFOL by inten-
sions, not extensions, a thought that we spell out a little in the next section. It is worth
15As Bressan observed, one obtains exactly the same logic if one allows that extensional domains are case
relative, as long as these case-relative or “variable” domains are all of the same cardinality; but CIFOL
itself has a single extensional domain. As noted above, this does not render CIFOL a “constant domain”
logic.
16As a matter of convenience, we permit use-mention ambiguity for ∗.
17We use the style of definition prescribed by [30, Ch. 8]; so we are thinking of Definition 1 as an “axiom”
added to a theory formulated in CIFOL. In contrast many subsequent definitions should be conceived as
added to our semantic theory of CIFOL rather than to CIFOL itself.
18Carnap [10] and many later logicians say “individual concept” where we write “individual intension.”
We make the change to avoid false connotations: In our usage, there is nothing “conceptual” about
individual intensions.
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repeating that a CIFOL intension is not meant to give the meaning of an expression:
There is nothing either linguistic or mental or social about intensions. This is easiest
to see when the cases are taken as times: Certain intensions can represent the entire
history of concrete individuals and their possibilities, and regardless of whether or
not one endorses the view that an individual is to be metaphysically identified with
its history and possibilities, it is good to say that this identification is perfectly rea-
sonable for logic. As for extensions, they may in such a temporal setting be thought
of as “stages” of individuals. Extensions are a powerful technical tool; however, like
stages, they have no place in the ontology of common sense, nor in the ontology of
CIFOL (see also Section 5.1, esp. footnote 49).
2.5 Assignments and Individuals
As noted, the intensional type of each individual term is, uniformly,  → D. In
addition to cases, , we must consider that expressions may contain free variables
that are later to be bound by quantifiers or other devices. We therefore need to work
with assignments to the variables; we let δ range over the set of all such assignments,
that is, over the set  = Vars → ( → D). Thus, each δ ∈  assigns an individual
intension to each individual variable.19
In typical applications of CIFOL, individuals of the concrete world, to use Quine’s
phrase, are represented as certain individual intensions, namely, those that fall under
certain absolute properties in the sense of Definition 18 below in Section 4.3. It is a
confusion to identify CIFOL extensions and individuals—a confusion that is made
seemingly plausible by thinking of cases as “worlds,” and of the extensions of indi-
vidual terms at a world (the “inhabitants” of these worlds, as one might say), as
individuals. Case-intensional logic, which makes no mandatory assumptions about
the structure of the cases, helps to avoid this confusion: Why should the extension
of an individual term at a case be the individual itself? Certainly individuals are not
case-bound in natural language: Socrates, who is running in one case, is the same
individual that is not running in another case; and Socrates at 2:00 p.m. is the same
man as Socrates at 4:00 p.m. The discussion of Section 5 will show how to spell all
this out without invoking “trans-world identity.”
In accord with Quine’s famous comment as guest in [10], extensions have “been
dropped from among the values of the variables” of CIFOL. Quine took this as a
fault; we do not: There is no danger that “the individuals of the concrete world” might
disappear, “leaving only their concepts behind them” [10, p. 197]. The reason is that
in accord with the still more famous Quine dictum, that to be is to be the value of
a variable, CIFOL represents concrete individuals precisely as certain values of its
variables: Such values must fall under a natural absolute property.20 The temporal
application makes the point vivid: Socrates is represented as a function in  →
19Note that this type is mathematically equivalent to  → (Vars → D), so that an assignment can
alternatively be pictured as a family, indexed by , of assignments of extensions to the variables. While
mathematically equivalent, this way of thinking about variables can create confusions and is to be avoided.
20Other values can represent gerrymandered individuals: “Socrates at 2:00 p.m. and Plato at 4:00 p.m.,”
which might be the intension of “the philosopher on the corner.”
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D, which (accurately) represents Socrates as persisting through many moments. Of
course Socrates is not eternal; CIFOL will represent this via the truth of “Socrates =
∗” in each case γ in  at which Socrates fails to exist.
3 Semantics
3.1 Basic Case-Intensional Semantics
We can now lay out, recursively, case-intensional semantics for CIFOL.21 Through-
out, we silently assume that variables have been chosen so as to avoid collision or
confusion. We begin by laying out in one place all the various semantic parameters
needed for the recursive account of intension and extension. For ease of exposition,
we treat only single-argument predicate and operator constants.
Semantic Parameters for CIFOL.  is the set of cases, and γ is a member of . D
is the extensional domain, d is a member of D.  is the set Vars → ( → D) of
intensional assignments of values to the variables, and δ is a member of . I is an
intensional interpretation of the individual, predicate, and operator constants, each
having a form dictated by the grammar. Thus, I(c) ∈  → D, I(p) ∈  → 2,
I(P ) ∈  → (( → D) → 2) and I(f ) ∈  → (( → D) → D), provided P
and f are one place—which is the only case that we treat explicitly.22 All semantic
information required for understanding closed expressions (i.e., no free variables) is
included in a “model,” M = 〈,D, I〉.
As announced, we will stay general and talk about cases γ ∈  only in the abstract
here (we give some structure to  in some examples). The heart of case-intensional
semantics is the double dictum that each meaningful expression, ξ , including those
with free variables, has (1) an intension that depends only on the model, M, and an
assignment, δ, to the variables, and (2) for each case, γ , an extension that depends on
the model, M, the assignment, δ, and the case, γ .23
3.1.1 Intension and Extension
Expressions will have intensions, relativized to M, and also to δ if the expression
may contain free variables. We write
intM,δ(ξ)
21Like all model-theoretic semantics, CIFOL’s falls on the “B” rather than on the “A” side of McTaggart’s
famous dichotomy.
22In these terms, the signature of extensional predication (see Definition 13) would lie in the characteriza-
tion of I(P ): I(P ) ∈  → (D → 2), or equivalently,  → ℘(D), instead of  → (( → D) → 2) or
 → ℘( → D).
23In the context of CIFOL, the double dictum must not be shortened to the appalling slogan, “each mean-
ingful expression has an intension and an extension.” Note also that δ is irrelevant and may be dropped in
speaking of the intension, or extension-at-γ , of expressions that contain no free variables.
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(omitting δ when irrelevant), which will always have the form  → X, for X the
set of appropriate extensions for expressions having the same type as ξ . Expressions
will also have an extension in each γ ∈ , also relativized to M, and also to δ when
there might be free variables. We write
extM,δ,γ (ξ),
which will always satisfy the fundamental equations
Definition 2 (Extension from Intension)
extM,δ,γ (ξ) =df (intM,δ(ξ))(γ )
and
Definition 3 (Intension from Extension)
intM,δ(ξ) =df λγ [γ ∈ ](extM,δ,γ (ξ)).
Henceforth we omit explicit use of the restricting clause “[γ ∈ ]” that occurs
in Definition 3.24 The core idea is that an intension, far from being something either
mental or linguistic, is a pattern of extensions in γ , as γ ranges over the set 
of cases.
Since extension and intension are correlative, in some contexts we take Defini-
tion 3 as semantically prior, in which case Definition 2 serves as a definition, and
in other contexts the other way around. Circularity is avoided by our recursive use
of extensions and intensions. We go over the clauses for each grammatical type of
CIFOL as listed in Section 2.1.
3.1.2 Generalities: Sentences and Terms
CIFOL virtuously treats in strict parallel the semantics of the two categorematic syn-
tactic classes, sentences and terms. To support this parallelism, it has to turn out that
each sentence, 	 [each term, α] will take as value, for each assignment, δ, a senten-
tial (or propositional) [an individual] intension, which is a mapping from the cases
to the set of truth values, 2 [to the domain, D] :
intM,δ(	) ∈  → 2 [intM,δ(α) ∈  → D].
A sentential [individual] extension on assignment δ in case γ is a truth value, that is,
a member of 2 [a member of D]
extM,δ,γ (	) ∈ 2 [extM,δ,γ (α) ∈ D].
We obtain part of these requirements by means of parallel constraints on I and δ that
are used in the base case of an inductive account of extension and intension: For each
24Risking the remote possibility of use-mention confusion, we will both mention λ as an element of CIFOL
in the context λx (with x an individual variable), and use it in the context λγ (with γ ranging over cases).
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sentential constant, p, [individual constant, c ], its intensional interpretation must be
a mapping from  into 2 [into D]:
intM(p) =df I(p) (hence intM(p) ∈  → 2)
intM(c) =df I(c) (hence intM(c) ∈  → D)
and for each individual variable, x, its intensional value on assignment δ must be of
the same type as interpretations of individual constants:
intM,δ(x) =df δ(x) (hence intM,δ(x) ∈  → D).
Then the extensions-in-γ come from Definition 2. It is part of the uniformity of case-
intensional semantics that the constant/variable distinction makes no difference to
the type of their intensions, a choice that greatly simplifies the use of CIFOL. For
example, this uniformity licenses unrestricted use of the rules of universal instantia-
tion and existential generalization. More important, however, is that case-intensional
semantics satisfies two critical requirements on any fully adequate logic, namely,
“the essential substitution property” and “the vacuous assignment property.” To state
them succinctly, we need to introduce clear notation both for syntactic subsitution
and for assignment-shift.
Definition 4 (Syntactic Substitution) [α/x](ξ) is the result of putting the closed
individual term, α, for every free occurrence of the variable x in expression ξ .
Definition 5 (Assignment-Shift) Where x, y ∈ Vars, δ ∈ Vars → ( → D), z ∈
( → D), and [z/x](δ) ∈ Vars → ( → D):
([z/x](δ))(y) =df
{
z iff y = x;
δ(y) otherwise.
Thus, [z/x](δ) may be read “the assignment that results from shifting the assign-
ment δ by giving x the intensional value z, and leaving alone the assignment to all
other variables.”
Definition 6 (Essential Substitution Property) If there is no confusion or collision of
variables (e.g., if α is closed),
extM,δ,γ ([α/x](ξ)) = extM,[intM,δ (α)/x](δ),γ (ξ).
At this point, we intend Definition 6 as a desideratum, or as a fact that depends on
later developments. It says that you can calculate the extension on assignment δ in
case γ of the result of substituting closed α for x in ξ by first calculating the assign-
ment, call it δ′, that results by altering δ by giving x as intensional value the intension
of α, and leaving alone the assignment to all other variables, and then calculating
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the extensional value of ξ on δ′ in γ . The essential substitution property is, mutatis
mutandis, fundamental to extensional first order logic, required (among other things)
for verifying that universal instantiation and existential generalization preserve truth.
No modal logic that breaks uniformity in the sense of treating variables and constants
differently (giving constants a more extensive set of values than the set allowed for
variables) can be expected to have the “essential substitution property.”
Next comes the apparently trivial but surprisingly deep companion to the essential
substitution property, which is also required of a fully adequate logic:25
Definition 7 (Vacuous Assignment Property) The semantic value of an expression,
ξ , shall never depend on assignments to variables that do not occur free in ξ .
In developing a semantics for CIFOL, we take pains to satisfy the essential
substitution property and the vacuous assignment property.
3.1.3 Operator Constants, Predicate Constants, Complex Terms, Predications
CIFOL permits operators and predicates of arbitrary n-arity; however, we give
explicit treatment only to one-place operators and predicates, leaving those with
many places to mutatis mutandis. Because of uniformity, we may treat operators and
predicates together. Since the intension of a term [sentence] is always a function in
 → D [ → 2], it is hardly surprising that the intension of a one-place opera-
tor constant, f , [predicate constant, P ] is conceptually equivalent to a function in
( → D) → ( → D) [( → D) → ( → 2)].
In other words, the natural type of a one-place predicate constant would have the
type of functions from individual intensions into sentential intensions (propositions),
and would underwrite the characterization of the intension of a predicate as a propo-
sitional function (a` la Russell).26 In a strictly parallel fashion, the natural type of an
intensional operator would be the type of functions from individual intensions into
individual intensions (intensions in, intensions out). The official type, however, as
promised in Section 3.1.2, must have the form  → X, and so we use the transpose
instead:
intM(f ) = dfI(f ) ∈  → (( → D) → D);
intM(P ) = dfI(P ) ∈  → (( → D) → 2).
(Just this once: If f were binary, the type of its intension would need to be  →
((( → D) × ( → D)) → D), and so on.) So, by Definition 2,
extM,γ (f ) ∈ (( → D) → D); extM,γ (P ) ∈ (( → D) → 2).
25See Kishida [20] for a category-theoretic explanation of this claim.
26The overwhelmingly common (but regrettable) choice of standard first-order quantified modal logics is
to let the type of the intension of a predicate constant be  → (D → 2), or, equivalently,  → ℘(D),
thereby forcing all predicates to be extensional as a matter of logic. This choice severely reduces the
expressive power of any such quantified modal logic.
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All that is intuitive and good; but note that the types of f [P ] and α don’t quite
match as function and argument, which threatens blockage of a semantic account of
complex terms, f (α) [predications, P(α)]. For this reason, the intension of a complex
term, intM,δ(f (α)) [predication, intM,δ(P (α))], has to be defined in a somewhat
roundabout way. First, recursively defining the extension of f (α) [P(α)] on δ relative
to γ is straightforward:
extM,δ,γ (f (α)) =df (extM,γ (f ))(intM,δ(α)) ∈ D;
extM,δ,γ (P (α)) =df (extM,γ (P ))(intM,δ(α)) ∈ 2
(the types match). Then, in accord with the uniform definition of intM,δ(ξ) in terms
of extM,δ,γ , as in Definition 3, we may define
intM,δ(f (α)) =df λγ ((extM,γ (f ))(intM,δ(α)));
intM,δ(P (α)) =df λγ ((extM,γ (P ))(intM,δ(α))).
The upshot is that case-intensional semantics treats predicate constants as strictly
analogous to operator constants: Just replace the target, D, by 2 = {T, F}.
It is occasionally useful to employ the epsilon (element of) notation for
predication.
Definition 8 (∈) If P is a predicate (including a λ-predicate as introduced just below)
and α is an individual term,
α ∈ P ↔df P(α).
The two notations are not intended to mark a logical difference.
3.1.4 Lambda-Operators, -Terms, -Predicates, and -Predications
A λ-operator [-predicate] of CIFOL is made by prefixing λx, for x an individual vari-
able, to a term [sentence], for example, λx(f (x, (g(x)))) [λx(x = α)], presumably
a term [a sentence] that contains x free. Because CIFOL is to be first order (no quan-
tification over higher types), we require that a λ-operator [-predicate] can occur only




as long as collision or confusion of variables is avoided. Then Definition 2 gives the
extension-in-γ of of the λ-term (λx(β))α [of the λ-predication (λx(	))α].
Given that in CIFOL λ-operators λx(β) [λ-predicates λx(	)] are restricted
to operator [predicate] positions, it is obvious that adding these λ-forms is
conservative.
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3.1.5 Identity
The two-place predicate constant, =, deserves special notice, because it is both an
extensional predicate and used to help characterize extensional predicates in CIFOL
(Definition 13). In each case, γ , the extension in γ of an identity statement depends
only on the extension in γ of the terms:
extM,δ,γ (α1 = α2) =df
{
T iff extM,δ,γ (α1) = extM,δ,γ (α2);
F otherwise.
As you can see, the fundamental thought is not that identity is “contingent”; rather,
the basic feature of identity is that it is case-dependent.27 Case-dependent identity is
extensional identity, or identity of extensions. The definition of the intension of an
identity accords with Definition 3:
intM,δ(α1 = α2) =df λγ (extM,δ,γ (α1 = α2)).
Although tedious to prove, it is intuitively reasonable to expect that identity of inten-
sions of terms α and β suffices for replacement of α by β in an arbitrary CIFOL
context, as long as one doesn’t run up against confusion or collision of bound
variables.
3.1.6 Truth-Functional, Modal, and Quantificational Connectives
The clauses for the truth-functional connectives are standard: Taking ¬ and ∧ to be
basic, we have the following for the extensions (the intensions are again defined via
Definition 3, being the respective functions from the set of cases ):
extM,δ,γ (¬	) =df
{
T iff extM,δ,γ (	) = F;
F otherwise.
extM,δ,γ (	1 ∧ 	2) =df
{
T iff extM,δ,γ (	1) = extM,δ,γ (	2) = T;
F otherwise.
Then the semantics of other truth functional connectives such as the conditional, →,
and the biconditional, ↔, fall right out as expected.
27 Discussions of so-called contingent identity are concerned with examples such as the one given in
[17], in which Lumpl (a lump of clay) and Goliath (a statue) exist at the same place at exactly the same
times (they come into and go out of existence together), while that was not necessarily so. This story
relies on treating constitution as identity (a matter on which CIFOL, as a logic, remains silent), and on an
asymmetric handling of temporal cases “in the real world” and modal cases, which leads to the idea of
world-bound individuals, Lumpl and Goliath, that have counterparts making true modal properties (such
as possibly going out of existence in a different way) that underwrite the contingency of their identity.
CIFOL has no use for this complex machinery, and it can represent the relevant aspects of the story in
a straightforward manner: Allowing for temporal-modal cases, there is a whole range of cases (in the
example, a full history) in which Lumpl = Goliath holds, and there are cases in which Lumpl = Goliath.
Using the notion of an absolute property (see Section 4.3), CIFOL can even allow that Lumpl and Goliath
fall under different sortal predicates while sharing their extension in many cases: such an extension is
then traced under two different principles of identity, allowing for the intensional difference of Lumpl
and Goliath even if both are proper substances. (On the issue of whether this makes metaphysical sense,
CIFOL, as a logic, remains silent.)
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For the alethic modal connectives, we employ the standard S5 semantics. (We beg
leave to doubt the usefulness of alethic modalities that rely on relational semantics.)
extM,δ,γ (	) =df
{




T iff for some γ ′ ∈ , (extM,δ,γ ′(	) = T);
F otherwise.
Again, the intension is derived from the various extensions-in-γ via Definition 3. As
usual, the strong modality  and the weak modality ♦ turn out to be duals, so that we
can treat  as semantically basic and introduce the weak modality as an abbreviation:
♦ =df ¬¬.
The semantics of quantifiers is, not surprisingly, more complicated, in precisely
the same fashion as the semantics of quantifiers in classical logic. Using z, as
before, as ranging over  → D, we rely on the assignment-shift notation (Defini-








T iff ∀z(if z ∈ ( → D) then extM,[z/x](δ),γ (	) = T);
F otherwise.
Then, by Definition 3,
intM,δ(∃x	) =df λγ (extM,δ,γ (∃x	)),
and
intM,δ(∀x	) =df λγ (extM,δ,γ (∀x	)).
Since ∀x and ∃x are interdefinable in the same fashion as in first order logic, we
could stick to the former as basic. Finally, we note that as a result of the independence
of the choice of case, γ ∈ , and the choice of intension, z ∈ (γ → D), both the
Barcan formula, ♦∃x	 → ∃x♦	, and its converse, ∃x♦	 → ♦∃x	, turn out valid,
as do the equivalent statements formulated with  and ∀.29 Both are usually found
problematic. Consider the Barcan formula, and take 	 to stand for “x is a Dodo.”
28As we mentioned in Section 2.5 above, logicians mesmerized by two familiar Quinean dogmas can
hardly avoid thinking that it is somehow a requirement of an honest logic that the values of variables should
be extensions, and that to be is to be the value of a variable. To repeat, CIFOL rejects the first dogma, but
is happy to accommodate the second dogma in the following sense: To be an individual in the concrete
world is to be the value of a variable ranging over individual intensions that fall under some natural sortal.
See also Section 4.3 below.
29A valid sentence of CIFOL that to the uninformed is more astonishing than the Barcan formula is this:
If  is extensional (Definition 13),
M |= ∃xx → ∃xx.
It looks as if there is a permutation-of-quantifiers mistake; but it isn’t so. (It would appear that the axiom
of choice is needed for the proof of validity.)
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Let us consider an English sentence that looks like an instance of the Barcan formula
scheme:
If it could be that there exists a Dodo, then
there exists something that could be a Dodo. (1)
Now it is true to say that it could be that there exists a Dodo (it wasn’t necessary
that the Dodo became extinct), but it seems false to say that there exists something
that could be a Dodo (after all, only a Dodo could be a Dodo). This, however, does
not exhibit a problem with the validity of the Barcan formula in CIFOL. Rather,
since the range of CIFOL variables includes the “nonexistent entity,” ∗, the CIFOL
correspondent to (1) needs the existence predicate (Definition 1) in addition to the
existential quantifier:
♦∃x(Ex ∧ Dx) → ∃x(Ex ∧ ♦Dx). (2)
And this formula can be falisfied in CIFOL.
For brevity we only give an explicit model for converse Barcan. A typical English
counterexample takes 	 to stand for “x doesn’t exist”:
If there exists a thing that possibly doesn’t exist, then
possibly there exists a thing that doesn’t exist. (3)
Again, the antecedent is true, but the consequent is even logically false. But again,
the correct rendering of that sentence in CIFOL has to make explicit the use of the
existence predicate, leading to
∃x(Ex ∧ ♦¬Ex) → ♦∃x(Ex ∧ ¬Ex). (4)
It is easy to show that this formula is not a CIFOL validity. Let  = {γ1, γ2} and D =
{∗, a} with a = ∗, so that  → D can be represented as the set {a∗, aa, ∗a, ∗∗}.30
Let int (α) = a∗. Then since E(a∗) is true in γ1 but false in γ2, the antecedent of
(4) is true in γ1. But its consequent, being a logical falsehood, must fail in γ1, thus
showing how CIFOL, in which the converse Barcan formula is a validity, correctly
counterexamples the English converse Barcan lookalike, (3).
3.1.7 Unique Existence and Definite Descriptions
In contrast to the standard Russellian approach, the CIFOL semantics of definite
descriptions, following Frege, treats them as categorematic expressions having the
same semantic type as individual constants and individual variables, namely,  → D.
As a preliminary, we introduce ∃1x	 as saying that there exists exactly one x
such that 	—extensionally speaking. Then we define extensions and intensions for
ι
-terms.
30For notation, see the beginning of Section 5.1.
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Definition 9 (Unique Existence)
∃1x	 ↔df ∃x(	 ∧ ∀y([y/x]	 → y = x)).31
Let us abbreviate (	 ∧ ∀y([y/x]	 → y = x)) by 	1. Then, given an assignment
δ and a case γ , if extM,δ,γ (∃1x	) = T, then there is a unique d ∈ D such that for
any z ∈  → D, we have:
if extM,[z/x](δ),γ (	1) = T then z(γ ) = d.
We call this d the extensional witness for ∃1x	 at M, δ, γ . Now we define definite
descriptions as certain ι-terms that have an extension in each case:
Definition 10 (Definite Descriptions)
extM,δ,γ ( ιx	) =df
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∗ iff extM,δ,γ (∃1x	) = F,
the extensional
witness for
∃1x	 at M, δ, γ iff extM,δ,γ (∃1x	) = T.
Note that the definite description in CIFOL is a purely extensional construct. Of
course there is an intension for each definite description, defined by Definition 3. The
point, however, is that only extensional information is used, so that the ιconstruction
applied to extensionally equivalent properties gives rise to extensionally equivalent
terms.32
As with Frege and in contrast to Russell and his followers, the semantics of a
definite description is quite independent of the context in which it is embedded.
Because the CIFOL treatment of definite descriptions is transparent but unusual,
we note that definite descriptions in CIFOL always work properly for contexts that
are extensional (for the notation (extnl x)	, see Definition 13 below). That is, the
following is valid (see Definition 11):
(∃1x	 ∧ (extnl x)	) → [ ιx	/x]	.
The predicate version of this is perhaps easier to read:
(∃1xx ∧ (extnl x)x) → ( ιxx).
3.1.8 Defined Predicates
Part of what makes CIFOL easy to use is its unfettered ability to permit the introduc-
tion of new predicates by definition. The following schema is available for arbitrary
31Recall that by the convention mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.1, here and in the following, y
stands for a variable that does not occur in 	.
32Bressan worked out a useful intensional description construction; because, however, his account is
second order, we do not try to reconstruct it in CIFOL.
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	, provided one satisfies the standard criteria of eliminability and conservativeness,
just as in extensional logic—see [30, 154].
Definition: ∀x(Px ↔df 	).
At a slightly higher type, a logically equivalent form of definition would employ λ
abstracts:
Definition: (P =df λx	).
It is understood that identity of properties is logically definable at the first order by,
for example, ∀y(Py ↔ λx(	)y). The powerful upshot is that there is no difference,
in CIFOL, between the role of predicate letters, P , and λ-abstracts.
3.2 Truth and Validity
The ext/int notation shows off the ease of use and, above all, the uniformity of
CIFOL semantics: The central idea is applied uniformly to every part of speech.
Nevertheless it is helpful to recast the extension of sentences also in more familiar
terms, leaving intension to be construed by way of Definition 3. Accordingly, we
define a truth predicate, relative to M, δ and γ , in the common way, first in what
Carnap calls “the word language,” and then in a common symbolic form that we
shall use heavily. Then we define validity in the usual way, assuming as usual that
M = 〈,D, I〉.
Definition 11 (True, Valid, |=)
	 is true on M and δ in γ ↔df extM,δ,γ (	) = T.
M, δ, γ |= 	 ↔df extM,δ,γ (	) = T.
M |= 	 ↔df ∀γ ∈ , δ ∈  (M, δ, γ |= 	).
|= 	 ↔df 	 is valid ↔df M |= 	 for all models M.
As always, δ can be dropped when irrelevant.
3.3 Proof Theory of CIFOL
What is an appropriate proof theory for CIFOL? Bear in mind that CIFOL is intended
to be a first-order limited version of Bressan’s infinitely typed theory, MLν . Since
MLν squarely contains elementary arithmetic, it cannot have a sound and complete
proof theory. (Bressan [6] offers a kind of relative completeness; see Section N64.)
Nevertheless, for routine applications, the following version of CIFOL proof-theory
will do. (1) Take any formulation of the first order logic of truth functions and quan-
tifiers. (2) Add postulates characterizing identity as an equivalence relation (thus
omitting the usual replacement principles), and a postulate characterizing necessary
identity as a sufficient condition for replacement of one closed term by another in all
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(reasonable) CIFOL contexts. Add what is needed to ensure that Frege-style definite
descriptions and first-order-respecting lambda abstraction are available. (3) Add stan-
dard S5 postulates for necessity and possibility. (4) Finally, add use of the definitions
of absoluteness, etc.: Definitions 13–18. We do not claim that such a proof theory is
complete with respect to the rich CIFOL semantics that we have presented; indeed, it
certainly is not.33 CIFOL remains, however, as a tool that is helpful in the endeavor
to separate good arguments from bad ones among those framed in CIFOL’s gram-
mar. We illustrate applications of an informally described CIFOL “natural deduction”
style proof theory in Sections 4.3 and 5.5.
4 CIFOL Qualities and CIFOL Sortals
We have finished presenting the core of the logic CIFOL in terms of its primitive
grammar, semantics and proof theory: We will add nothing more “creative.” On the
other hand, in our view, no presentation of CIFOL can be taken to be complete
without a family of noncreative definitions characterizing certain logical properties
applicable to predicates. We take these first-order-definable properties of properties
to be as much an integral part of CIFOL as one takes the definitions of addition and
multiplication to be an integral part of Peano arithmetic. Accordingly, we complete
our formal account of CIFOL with seven definitions: Definition 13 of extensionality,
Definition 15 of extensionalization and existence, Definition 16 of modal constancy,
Definition 17 of modal separation, Definition 18 of absoluteness, Definition 14 of
CIFOL quality, and Definition 19 of CIFOL sortal. The definitions of modal separa-
tion and absoluteness are entirely original with Bressan.34 Finally, we set down two
theses that connect certain informal notions with (formal) CIFOL notions. Namely,
we advance the thesis that, up to an idealization, each natural quality satisfies the
defining conditions of a CIFOL quality, and each natural sort satisfies the defining
conditions of a CIFOL sortal.35
33As Bressan has shown, MLν has the resources to formulate an interesting and apt theory of truth-in-
a-case. First he introduces a predicate, ElR, such that the intensions falling under ElR are in perfect
correspondence with the set, , of cases. It is good to think of ElR as giving an account of “internal cases.”
For technical reasons, Bressan switches to a second internal representation, El, of the cases. Letting x
be an MLν variable ranging over the internal cases, Bressan uses this equipment to show how to define
an MLν construction that we take to have the sense of “That 	 is true in the internal case, x.” Bressan’s
treatment of this matter appears to go beyond CIFOL as we have presented it. It seems, however, that
redefining CIFOL as containing but a single additional first order axiom suffices for defining “true in a
case.” This theme is developed in [4].
34The ability to characterize certain predicates as absolute is, we think, the principal virtue of systems
allowing non-extensional predication. It is an order of magnitude more important than the ability to the-
orize wisely about various non-extensional (“opaque”) contexts of conversational English on which so
much of the literature focuses.
35It will be clear that we use “CIFOL quality” and “CIFOL sortal” as technical terms intended as revelatory
of the informal notions of “natural quality” and “natural sortal.” You will also see from our usage that we
are relaxed in our use of “property” and “predicate.”
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We turn now to the key CIFOL definitions of certain properties of properties; later,
in Section 5, we illustrate their usefulness. This means that we are going beyond
purely logical motivation: Considerations of metaphysics, and specifically the meta-
physics of individuals and sorts, will play a guiding role from now on. We repeat
that this will not lead us to tinker with the logic, but rather enable the easy addition
of extra-logical concepts, each with its characteristic axioms, to do the metaphysical
work. An adequate metaphysical picture of individuals and sorts must be based on
explicit considerations of time, modality, and their interaction. These explicit con-
siderations, leading to cases as moment/history pairs, will be the subject of Part II of
this essay. In this part, we stick to an abstract notion of cases. The general idea of
tracing an individual across cases via a sortal property can already be spelled out at
that level of generality.
As we noted in Section 2.4, the semantics of applying a predicate to an argument-
term in a case depends in general on the intension of the argument-term, not just
on its extension in the case. The concept of a property in case-intensional seman-
tics is therefore broad. Many predicates, however, are “extensional” (Definition 13):
Whether they apply to closed α in case γ depends only on the extension of α in γ
(i.e., on extM,γ (α)). Ordinary natural qualities are like that: Whether or not Jack is
lean is true in case γ depends only on whether Jack is lean in that very case.36 Other
properties are non-extensional: Whether or not they apply to α in case γ makes ref-
erence to other cases. For example, when cases are times, simple tensed statements
such as Jack was at home refer to other cases (past time periods), as do simple modals
such as Jack might be at Caroline’s (alternative possibilities). One-word examples of
non-extensional English predicates would be soluble and aggressive, which are natu-
rally taken to involve reference to possible cases. Among non-extensional predicates,
of paramount importance are “sortals” such as natural number and horse. We will
characterize CIFOL sortals via a pair of intensional properties, meaning thereby to
contribute to the clarification of the interface between logic and metaphysics with-
out ourselves waxing metaphysical. A critical feature of sortals is that they naturally
enable tracing across cases as discussed in Section 4.3 below. (You will do no wrong
if you read “sortal property” as “tracing property.”)
English tends to carry qualities with adjectives or verbs, while generally mark-
ing sortals with common nouns. Gupta [18] is a careful and illuminating formal
working-out of this policy. Montague [25] also treats qualities and sortals as differ-
ent categories of basic expressions. CIFOL, however, unlike English and Montague
and Gupta, does not distinguish qualities and sortals syntactically. Instead, follow-
ing Bressan, the distinction is marked by the properties with which each primitive
predicate is endowed by suitable axioms.37 Whether or not a predicate constant has
one of these properties naturally depends on the interpretation, I. We confine our
36We are thinking of a rough-and-ready notion of “is lean.” If one prefers to analyze leanness against a
background comparative, “is leaner than,” or “is leaner for a boy than,” CIFOL can handle an analysis that
would render “is lean” non-extensional.
37Such axioms are in spirit second order, but technically each is first order.
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discussion to one-place properties, leaving to the reader the easy but tedious general-
ization to n-place properties, including the possibility that a relational property might
be of a special type with respect to one argument but not another. It will be clear
that throughout we are ignoring vagueness, just as one does in applying standard
extensional logic.
4.1 Existence and Non-existence
We shall treat qualities and sorts separately. There is, however, one property of prop-
erties that might be thought common to every property. Although case-intensional
logic needs to allow for individual intensions representing that α does not exist in
a certain case (by setting M, γ |= α = ∗; see Definition 1), no matter the appli-
cation, it would be coherent to insist that every interesting candidate for a primitive
predicate, P , be “existence-implying” in each case:
Definition 12 (Existence-Implying) A property  is existence-implying ↔df M |=
∀x(x → Ex). For this, we write Exist-imp().
The restriction to “primitive” would be essential. Being existence-implying is,
for example, not closed under complementation: If Q is introduced by the defini-
tion ∀x(Qx ↔df ¬Px) (with P existence-implying), Q is not existence-implying.
Even so, the policy of requiring every primitive predicate to be existence-implying,
although coherent, would create more problems than it solves. Is it natural to suppose
that since Socrates is necessarily a Man, he must exist in every case? Certainly not if
the application is temporal, with the cases being time intervals. Therefore, it is not a
good idea to force Man to be existence-implying: We want to treat cases or times in
which Socrates doesn’t exist in a way that allows that he is a Man in those cases. We
want to say that the Man, Socrates, didn’t exist before he was born nor after his death.
This seems more puzzling than it has to be. Keep firmly in mind that (1) Socrates
is represented in CIFOL by an individual intension living from birth to death if the
cases are time intervals, (2) that Man, being a sortal, is non-extensional, applying to
the whole intension, whereas (3) existence is extensional and case-bound. The times
when Socrates doesn’t exist are marked by setting Socrates =∗ at those times. Only
in this way can we easily interpret the present truth of “Socrates is a Man who doesn’t
(now) exist, but formerly existed.” In contrast, it may appear suitable to suppose that
a natural quality such as “is six feet tall” be existence-implying: It seems unnecessary
to countenance “Socrates is six feet tall (now) but doesn’t exist (now).”38
The upshot is that we want the CIFOL representation of Socrates to have an exten-
sion at every case, that extension being ∗ when he doesn’t exist. Let us emphasize and
re-emphasize that the CIFOL representation of Socrates is a matter of choice, not of
38Still, in our general formal definition of a CIFOL quality, Definition 14 below, we do not include the
requirement that such a quality be existence-implying. We can easily enter such a requirement explicitly
if that is called for in a specific case.
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metaphysics.39 For instance, science and metaphysics are hardly likely to totter when
faced with the view that at the present moment, Socrates = Plato, meaning that they
have the same extension, namely, ∗. As logicians, however, we do have to take spe-
cial account of the fact that our representations of Socrates and Plato at the present
moment are identical. See our treatment of “modal separation” in Section 4.3. We
also need to be thoughtful about sentences or terms containing the symbol, ∗. Doubt-
less if f represents “the average distance of (. . . ) from the Sun,” then we should
have M, γ |= f (∗) = ∗. If, however, f represents “the mother of,” then suppos-
ing γ is a case or time in which JFK doesn’t exist but his mother does, even though
M, γ |= JFK = ∗, one would want M, γ |= f (JFK) = Rose Kennedy = ∗
(“the-mother-of” is non-extensional).
4.2 CIFOL Qualities are Extensional
In a typical application of CIFOL, the vast majority of primitive predicates will rep-
resent “qualities” carried in English by descriptive constructions such as “smells
sweet” or “is six feet to the north of Mary.” The formal mark of a quality predicate
in CIFOL is extensionality (“a rose by any other definite description would smell as
sweet”). Run-of-the-mill extensionality is a local property; that is, extensionality is
case-dependent. Properties that are extensional in some but not all cases can be use-
ful, but they are comparatively rare. For this reason, we reserve plain “extensional”
for what might be called “everywhere extensional.”40
Definition 13 (Extensionality, Extensional, (extnl x)) A property  is extensional
iff it is extensional at every γ ∈ , i.e., iff the following holds:
M |= ∀ x ∀ y (x = y → ((x) ↔ (y))).
A context 	, presumably with free x, is extensional with respect to x iff the following
holds:
M |= ∀ y (x = y → (	 → [y/x]	)).
(extnl x)	 is to be read as “	 is extensional with respect to x” and is defined as
follows:
(extnl x)	 ↔df ∀ y (x = y → (	 → [y/x]	)).
For conceptual bookkeeping, it is convenient to introduce the following bit of
redundancy.
39Bressan [6] makes a different choice. We won’t go into the matter except to register our belief that every
way of representing the workings of case-dependently empty names requires some unexpected complica-
tion. Note that on our choice, but not on many others, we can have names for things of a certain kind in
a uniform way: If α is a name for a P , then Pα is true in any case. (We don’t have to check whether the
bearer of the name still exists in order to use it properly.)
40One use of the case-dependent notion that comes to mind is in the characterization of a property as a
“set” when some case, call it γR , is intended as “the real case.” Then it is good to say that a property is a
set only if it is both modally constant and also extensional in the real case. See [7]. Another use crops up
in connection with the At n: construction, as discussed in Section 5.2.
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Definition 14 (CIFOL Quality) A property, , is a CIFOL quality ↔df  is
extensional.
We are now prepared to state a thesis connecting natural qualities with CIFOL
qualities.
Thesis 1 (Qualities) Up to an idealization, natural qualities are CIFOL qualities;
that is, they are extensional.
We said that almost all primitive predicates are extensional. The prime examples
of non-extensional predicates are the absolute predicates, to which idea we soon
turn. First, however, we define the extensionalization of  as the weakest extensional
“super-predicate” of , and then we define the result of forcing an existence-
implying version of  by deleting from this all the individual intensions that do not
exist (Definition 1).
Definition 15 (Extensionalization and Existence: (e) and (e!))
∀x[(e)x ↔df ∃y[y = x ∧ y]],
∀x[(e!)x ↔df [(e)x ∧ Ex]].
When  represents a sort, it seems that we often want both  and either (e)
or (e!), each to do its own job. We postpone illustration until we have introduced
absolute properties, a task to which we now turn.
4.3 CIFOL Sortals: Modally Constant and Modally Separated
We will define absoluteness as a conjunction of two other non-extensional properties
of properties, modal constancy and modal separation. This unique development is
an entirely original contribution of Bressan.41 The first of the two ideas is modal
constancy, defined as follows.
Definition 16 (Modal Constancy) A property  is modally constant iff
(MConst) M |= ∀ x (♦x → x).
Given non-extensional predication, this is “rigidity” of predicates or properties.
(The displayed definition doesn’t work properly if  is extensional. In fact in CIFOL
there are only two properties that are both extensional and modally constant: the
modally empty property and the modally universal property.) Back in the day of
41Those familiar with [6] will observe that in reworking, adjusting, and simplifying Bressan’s account, we
omitted his idea of a “quasi-absolute” property, which is not useful in CIFOL.
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Kripke and Putnam, rigidity of singular terms and predicates was often treated as
essentially the same property, distinguished only by grammatical category. Recall,
however, that modal constancy or “rigidity” of singular terms or individual intensions
has no use in CIFOL, and indeed is not expressible (Section 2.3). In contrast, modal
constancy of properties is exactly the idea of “rigidity” applied to properties: If  is
modally constant, then extM,γ () = extM,γ ′() for all cases γ, γ ′ ∈ .42
The second leg on which absoluteness stands is modal separation:
Definition 17 (Modal Separation) A property  is modally separated iff
(MSep) M |= ∀ x ∀ y ((x ∧ y) → (♦(Ex ∧ Ey ∧ x = y) → x = y)).
A property is modally separated iff, roughly, individual intensions falling under it
at any case are either everywhere identical or never. The logical point is that if α falls
under a modally separated property at a case, then, in this special situation, as long
as α exists in the case, the extension of α determines its intension, so that except for
cases of non-existence, α1 = α2 being true in some case suffices for replacement of
α1 by α2 in any and every CIFOL context.43 Putting modal constancy together with
modal separation yields absoluteness:
Definition 18 (Absoluteness) A property  is absolute iff it is modally constant and
modally separated. Where  is a predicate, possibly a λ-predicate, we let Abs()
abbreviate “ is absolute.”
To serve as a convenient companion to “CIFOL quality” (Definition 14), we intro-
duce “CIFOL sortal” as definitionally equivalent to “absolute property,” in order
to emphasize the difference between the formal notion of a CIFOL sortal and the
informal notion of a natural sortal.
Definition 19 (CIFOL Sortal) A property, , is a CIFOL sortal ↔df  is an absolute
property.
Modal absoluteness provides an analysis of the case-intensional aspects of natural-
language sortal predicates in CIFOL, spelling out formally specifiable necessary
conditions for a predicate to be a natural sortal. There is, however, no suggestion
that absoluteness—or any other formalizable property—fully captures those proper-
ties that a property must have to be a “substance concept” useful in either scientific
42Oddly enough, in CIFOL we use the universal identity of extensions of a property,  (that is, modal
constancy), without having any use for the retail identity of individual extensions of  at a pair of distinct
cases γ, γ ′.
43The concept of modal separation is, perhaps, the single most original idea of Bressan’s contribution to
quantified modal logic. Parks [27] invoked Bressan’s concept to some purpose, and Gupta [18] not only
used the concept but significantly elaborated on it. Aside from these two publications, even as deep and
important as is modal separation, we have been unable to find anything remotely like it in the literature.
(Montague’s IL is powerful enough to define modal separation, but Montague didn’t exercise this power.)
Exercise: Explain why Bressan’s profound ideas have been ignored for four decades.
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or metaphysical applications; we do not aim at giving a sufficient condition. Just for
starters, there are just far too many trivial absolute properties, and absoluteness taken
alone omits the pragmatics of scientific properties, along with much else. Bressan
speaks of natural absolute properties, and so shall we.
A sortal property is meant to answer the Aristotelian question of “what a thing is.”
As Aristotle explains in his Categories by the example of Socrates, to say that he is
white (or pale), is not yet to say what he is: That is a merely contingent (“accidental”)
property. In fact, being white is quite plausibly taken to be an extensional property in
the sense of Definition 13: It applies or doesn’t apply, given an individual and a case,
and that is all there is to that.44 The property of being white is ascribed to Socrates
purely by considering the property’s principle of application at a case. To say that
Socrates is a man, however, is to answer the “what is it?” question, according to
Aristotle: It is to say what sort the thing belongs to. A sortal property, such as being
a horse, or a man, supplies not just a principle of application, but also a principle of
identity, or, as we like to say, a tracing principle.45 If we have said what Socrates
is (namely, a man), we have thereby specified something that he could not not be:
This is precisely modal constancy. Being white, on the other hand, is obviously not
modally constant: If Socrates becomes sunburned and turns red, he will cease to be
white, but he will not thereby cease to be Socrates.46 There is also a clear motivation
for requiring the property of being a man to be modally separated: Because Socrates
is a man, he can be traced under that concept from time to time or case to case, and
there cannot exist a man who coincides with him in one case but not in another.47
Sortal concepts are absolute. Thus, we are prepared to defend the following thesis:
Thesis 2 (Sortals) Up to an approximation, every natural sortal is a CIFOL sortal;
that is, every natural sortal is absolute, which is to say, is modally constant and
modally separated.
44Running is another favorite illustration of an accidental property of Socrates. There is a debate in philos-
ophy of physics whether one can ascribe instantaneous velocities to things in an intrinsic manner. For an
argument to the effect that one cannot, as well as for some background references to that debate, see [9].
We will not need to enter that debate here, being assured that on the one hand there are certainly at least
some extensional properties, and on the other hand, case-intensional semantics welcomes non-extensional
properties.
45The now common distinction between a principle of application and a principle (or criterion) of identity
(see, e.g., [11, p. 546] and [18, p. 2]) comes from Geach [16, §31], who in turn follows Aquinas in
“distinguishing general terms as substantival and adjectival.”
46It is obvious that the compound, “white horse,” definable as the intersection of a quality with a sortal, is
neither extensional nor absolute. Along the same lines, we analyze phased sortals such as “boy,” which do
arguably answer the Aristotelian question of what a thing is but aren’t modally constant, into a true sortal
(“man”) and a quality (“under-age”); see [35, p. 30ff]. In the other direction, in Section 5.4 we definitely
classify “natural number” as a sortal because it is important that numbers can be traced from case to case,
whereas it would be absurd to think of natural numbers as metaphysically akin to Aristotelian substances
such as horses.
47This is our brief comment on the question of relative identity as raised in [16]: We hold that Geachean
examples necessarily mix true sortal, absolute properties (such as being a man) with non-sortal properties.
For a diagnosis similar in spirit, see [24].
424 N. Belnap, T. Mu¨ller
It is instructive to prove that if  is a CIFOL sortal, then necessarily, if α ∈ (e!),
there is an unique member of  that is extensionally identical to α; that is, to prove
Fact 1 (From Absoluteness to Necessary Identity)
Abs() → [(e!)α → ∃x[x = α ∧ x ∧ ∀y[(y = α ∧ y) → x = y]]].
Note that Fact 1 contains three occurrences of the absolute predicate, , in pred-
icative position: Once  is used in the context of an extensionalization, (e!), that
is used for reporting the local fact that in the case at hand, α is (extensionally) iden-
tical to an intension falling under —recall that Definition 15 defines (e!)α as
∃z(z = α ∧ z) ∧ Eα. And twice  is used as a tracing principle that, in effect,
traces the individual falling under  in the case at hand to “the same individual” in




3 x0 = α ∧ x0 ∧ Eα 2, def, choose x0
4 y0 = α ∧ y0 hyp, choose y0
5 x0 = y0 ∧ Ex0 3, 4
6 x0 ∧ y0 3, 4
7 ♦(Ex0 ∧ Ey0 ∧ x0 = y0) 5, S5
8 (x0 = y0) 6, 7, 1 (MSep())
9 ∀y[(y = α ∧ y) → (x0 = y)] 4–8, (y0/y)
10 ∃x[x = α ∧ x ∧ ∀y[(y = α ∧ y) →
x = y]] 3, 9, (x0/x)
11 [(e!)α → ∃x[x = α ∧ x∧
∀y[(y = α ∧ y) → x = y]]] 2–10, 1, S5
12 Abs() → [(e!)α → ∃x[x = α ∧ x∧
∀y[(y = α ∧ y) → x = y]]]. 1–11
Put semantically, the relevant logical fact is this: If Abs(),
then if M, γ |= α1 ∧ α2 ∧ Eα1 ∧ Eα2, then
extM,γ (α1) = extM,γ (α2) → intM(α1) = intM(α2).
So the following definition is acceptable whenever  is absolute and (e!)α: α is
the intensionally unique individual intension, x, such that x = α ∧ x.
Suppose  is carried in English by the common noun, horse, and suppose α is
taking the place of Carlotta’s favorite Christmas present. Then one might read Fact 1
as follows: If horse is an absolute property [which, of course, it is], then if Carlotta’s
favorite Christmas present is a horse in a certain case, then Carlotta’s favorite Christ-
mas present is identical (in that case) to the necessarily unique traceable individual
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falling under the property of being a horse. That is, however, such a mouthful that
we introduce an informal device. In English, we permit ourselves to say that α is an
absolute horse, which makes no literal sense, meaning thereby that α falls under the
absolute property of being a horse. In the same spirit, we occasionally say that some
α is an extensional horse, meaning thereby that α is identical, in the case at hand, to
an existing absolute horse.
5 Illustrations
5.1 The Horses
As evidence of its usefulness, we illustrate applications of some central ideas of
CIFOL using an imaginary finite version of “is a horse,” represented by the predi-
cate, H , which should certainly be an absolute property. We want to work through
the example in detail and with diagrammatic pictures. For this reason, we imag-
ine that there are five horses, Andy, Doris, Gale, Hal, and Jack, and four cases,
 = {γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4}. The four cases may be thought of as one-hour time periods, with
γi starting at, say, i o’clock p.m. on a specific day.48 Let us suppose that the exten-
sional domain, D, contains at least {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, n, ∗}. It will help the
imagination to think of the lettered extensions as being distinct “horse stages” of
one or another of the five horses; and of course all distinct from ∗.49 It is conve-
nient to represent an individual intension over  by a sequence of length four, one
entry for each case; for example, ab∗d, for the individual intension, z (i.e., func-
tion in  → D), such that z(γ1) = a, z(γ2) = b, z(γ3) = ∗, and z(γ4) = d.
With that convention in mind, let us suppose that the individual intensions of the five
horses are as follows: int (Andy) = ab∗∗, int (Doris) = ∗def, int (Gale) = g∗∗∗,
int (Hal) = ∗hi∗, and int (Jack) = jkln. Since we have no information concerning the
nature of the “horse stages,” this display of intensions only tells us about Andy that he
exists at times γ1 and γ2, and then no longer exists.50 In the same way, the intension
48Choosing a set of time periods for the set of cases, , illustrates the flexibility of CIFOL, and reminds us
that CIFOL is logic rather than metaphysics. (We agree that calling time periods “cases” sounds awkward;
see footnote 14.)
49
“Stages,” which [28] glosses as “brief temporal segments” of, e.g., rabbits (§12), play a prominent
role as objects in metaphysical literature such as [29]. CIFOL, however, provides only a logic, sans meta-
physics. At the risk of sounding parochial, we wonder whether the metaphysical discussions are too loose
to be of help.
50Nothing logically useful comes of comparing extensions across cases. In particular, there is nothing
logical to be gained by using an intension aaaa, nor by insisting that a and b in the intension ab∗∗ be dis-
tinct: Identity/distinctness of extensions across cases is information that CIFOL cannot use. That should
count as a discovery by Bressan. It follows, as Bressan noted, and as we reported in footnote 15, that a
semantic system in which each case, γ , is given a distinct domain, Dγ (with or without overlaps, but all
equinumerous), would yield the same logic. (Perhaps it is worth saying explicitly that comparing exten-
sions at a certain case between individual intensions is quite essential; that is the work of the sign, =, of
case-dependent identity.)
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of Doris tells us that she begins to exist at time γ2, and then persists through times
γ3 and γ4. Gale has a short but happy life, as indicated by her intension; Hal com-
mences existing at time γ2, continuing to exist at time γ3, and then no longer exists.
And Jack lives through all four time periods. What, now, about the representation
of the absolute property, H = is a horse? Although the official type of a one-place
predicate such as H has the form  → (( → D) → 2), intensions of this type are
easier to visualize if put in a conceptually equivalent form by construing that type
as  → ℘( → D), which enables listing, for each case, the individual intensions
(horses) falling under that case. Table 1 therefore faithfully represents H as modally
constant by listing each of the five horse intensions under every case: If an individ-
ual is a horse in any case, then it is a horse in every case, including cases (as marked
by ∗) in which it fails to exist. This representation allows that horses come to be and
pass away, but rules out transubstantiation for horses. Horses cannot turn into other
things: Once a horse, always a horse.
Being a horse is also modally separated: If H(α) and H(β), then if α and β share
some non-∗ horse stage in any one case, then they are identical individual intensions;
which is to say, if horses α and β are distinct horses, then there is no single case in
which they share an extension, other than possibly ∗ (the sign of non-existence). That
is to say, there can be a case in which two horses both fail to exist. The convenient
visual sign of modal separation in any one case γi is this: If you look at the five
intensions listed in Table 1 under γi , there is no column containing a repetition of
anything other than possibly ∗. Of course because of modal constancy, the same
intensions fall under each γi , so that it suffices to check only a single case.
Let us dwell a bit on the issue of a principle of application vs. a principle of identity
or tracing principle, introduced in Section 4.3. Any property has to separate what falls
under it from what doesn’t. (Reminder: We make no attempt to illuminate vagueness.)
Confined to a single case, the best we can do to check whether an absolute property
 holds or doesn’t hold of a thing, α, is to check extensionally (see Definition 13),
with due attention to existence: If α falls under (e!) in case γ , then in that case there
is an existing thing α that is a true  and that is identical (extensionally) with α in
case γ . (Recall the remark following the proof in Section 4.3.) Thus, if α is “Mary’s
favorite thing,” α should not be represented by an individual intension for a horse
(because, for example, there is a case in which α is a mobile phone—or, which is
just as bad, she has different horses as her favorite in different time periods), but
Table 1 Horse intensions
H Case
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
Andy ab** ab** ab** ab**
Doris *def *def *def *def
Gale g*** g*** g*** g***
Hal *hi* *hi* *hi* *hi*
Jack jkln jkln jkln jkln
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Table 2 Existence-implying
extensionalization of H H(e!) Case
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
Andy a--- -b-- ∅ ∅
Doris ∅ -d-- --e- --- f
Gale g--- ∅ ∅ ∅
Hal ∅ -h-- --i- ∅
Jack j--- - k-- -- l- --- n
it could be Jack in case γ , and then, H(e!)α would be true, provided he exists in
that case.51
Table 2 describes H(e!), relying on the convention that a hyphen in a certain posi-
tion indicates, in a manageably brief way, that we are picturing a (very large) set
of individual intensions constructible by putting each member of D in place of the
hyphen. Thus, opposite Andy and under γi , we list every intension that is identical to
Andy in γi , omitting those that have a ∗ in the γi position.52
Now the work of absoluteness can be stated pictorially. Using Table 2, pick any
intension falling under (for example) γ1 in the extensional Table 2, perhaps a∗c∗ or
gdea. Observe that we have extensional-in-γ1 information only; that is, information
that is closed under identity in γ1. Now for Bressan’s profound observation: This
extensional information suffices for determining a unique intension falling under H ,
either ab** or g***. Given any intension falling under H(e!), and given the case,53
exactly one horse (one intension falling under H ) is determined. Since H is absolute,
then given a case, extension determines a unique intension. This illustrates the force
of the proof we gave in Section 4.3.
5.2 The Paddocks
To help illustrate how absolute and extensional properties interact, we temporarily
enrich CIFOL by adding one-place connectives At n: to be read “at γn,” for n =
1, 2, 3, 4.54 The semantics of Atn: is given as follows:
M, δ, γ |= At n:	 ↔ M, δ, γn |= 	.
51 We should not think of H vs. H(e!) as exposing an ambiguity in the English use of “horse”, but rather as a
convenient way of handling certain quantificational phenomena involving “horse.” The lexicon of English
has just one entry under “horse”, viz., “a solid-hoofed plant-eating domesticated mammal with a flowing
mane and tail, . . . ,” but on our analysis, a sentence containing “. . . is a horse” can exhibit quantifier scope
ambiguity reminiscent of the de re/de dicto distinction. See also Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below.
52The a--- entry under γ1 represents 143 = 2744 entries. By our count, under γ1 there should therefore be
8232 entries.
53You have to be given the case because modal separation is determined case by case.
54Bressan shows that the effect of quantifying over cases is already available in MLν at a higher order; see
footnote 33 above.
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Table 3 Respective occupants
of north and south paddocks γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
N a--- ∅ -- e- --- n
j---
S ∅ - b-- ∅ ∅
- k--
Evidently, if Atn:	 is true at a case γ , it is true at every case (since the Atn: connec-
tive always switches evaluation to the specific case γn). At the level of predicates,
this means that a lambda predicate with a leading Atn: will be modally constant, as
we will illustrate.
Imagine now that there are two paddocks, a north and a south, into which horses
are put at various times. Suppose that Andy and Jack are in the north paddock at γ1,
but are moved to the south paddock at γ2, and are then put back in the barn, while
Doris is put in north paddock (only) at γ3 and Jack is put in the north paddock (again)
at γ4. Table 3 represents this supposal, with N and S representing, extensionally, the
occupancy of the north and south paddocks at each time interval.
Table 4 contains the representations of λxAt 1:Nx and λxAt 2:Sx, each of which
is modally constant.
We’ve come this far in order to conjoin the two properties represented in Table 4,
yielding Table 5; it’s easy.
Given that in our story, it is only Andy and Jack who are in the north paddock at
γ1 and in the south paddock at γ2, this result is an unexpectedly weird collection of
intensions: Most of them are not among the proper horse-intensions of Table 1. What
has gone wrong? Mere extensional properties simply do not give us anything we can
use if based on more than one case. They are fine one-case-at-a-time, but the whole
thing goes to pieces when you try to mix multiple cases with extensional properties.
What is missing is the ability to trace individuals between cases, leading to (at best)
the gerrymandered horses of Table 5. What is needed is the absolute property of being
a horse. Then it all comes right: If you meet what we have so far with H , you arrive
at Table 6. The tracing power of the absolute property of being a horse returns us to
sanity.
Table 4 Applying At γ1 : and
At γ2 : γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
λxAt 1:Nx a--- a--- a--- a---
j--- j--- j--- j---
λxAt 2:Sx - b-- - b-- - b-- - b--
- k-- - k-- - k-- - k--
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Table 5 Gerrymandered horses
found in north paddock at γ1
and in south paddock at γ2
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
λx(At 1:Nx ∧ At 2:Sx) ab-- ab-- ab-- ab--
ak-- ak-- ak-- ak--
jb-- jb-- jb-- jb--
jk-- jk-- jk-- jk--
Table 6 Absolute horses found
in north paddock at γ1 and in
south paddock at γ2
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
λx(At 1:Nx ∧ At 2:Sx ∧ Hx) ab∗∗ ab∗∗ ab∗∗ ab∗∗
jkln jkln jkln jkln
5.3 Essential Properties: Sex
Let’s look at how a definite description works, say, ιxNx (the occupant of the north
paddock), in connection with “essential” properties. Keep in mind that according to
Table 3, N is extensional. First we identify the description’s intension according to
Definition 10 by consulting that table, recalling that we get a ∗ in any case without
exactly one entry (because we are counting distinct extensions):
int ( ιxNx) = ∗∗en.
That is, in some cases ιxNx is a female, Doris in γ3, and sometimes a male, Jack in
γ4, and sometimes “the occupant of the north paddock” doesn’t exist (either because
there is no occupant of the north paddock, in γ2, or more than one, in γ1). This seems
outrageous until one recalls that the range of x includes all individual intensions,
including gerrymandered horses.
There are male horses and there are female horses, properties that may be
represented with the extensional accounts pictured in Table 7.
It is common coin that the sex of each horse is a property that is “essential” to
it, qua horse.55 “Horse” in the preceding sentence is used once in the context, H(e!),
which produces an extensional construct, and once in the absolute sense, H . The first
occurrence is extensionalized; a horse, for instance, has a sex no matter how you
describe it. It is equally true that each particular horse (at the case in question) has
its sex as an essential property, qua horse, but certainly not qua occupant of the north
paddock, which is male in some cases and female in others. The second occurrence
is not extensional: You need to use “horse” (H ) as a tracing principle as you move
from case to case. Following that trace, you find out that either necessarily the horse
is male in every case in which it exists, or necessarily the horse is female in every
case in which it exists. Even though the sex of the occupant of the north paddock, i.e.,
55We are using “essential” in a minimal sense here, meaning just that the sex of a horse is a property such
that in all cases in which the horse exists, it has that property.
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Table 7 The extensional,
existence-implying properties
male and female
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
M = Male a--- - b-- ∅ ∅
∅ -h-- --i- ∅
j--- - k-- -- l- --- n
F = Female ∅ - d-- -- e- --- f
g--- ∅ ∅ ∅
the sex of ιxNx, varies case by case (because of gerrymandering), its sex qua horse
does not vary as you trace it from case to case.
As many philosophers have noted, English is not altogether convenient for sorting
out the matter. CIFOL notation helps.
M |= ∀x[H(e!)x → ∀y[(x = y ∧ Hy) → ((Ey → My) ∨ (Ey → Fy))]].
The use of H(e!) in this “constant sex” principle tells us that it applies to each exist-
ing horse, “under every description,” as the saying goes, which is precisely what is
wanted. The use of the absolute notion of “horse” represented by Hy is required
because the extensional characterization of x by H(e!)x is not enough to support the
use of x inside a modal context. If all you know of x is that H(e!) applies to it, you
do not have enough information to allow you to trace a value of x from case to case.
That is the point of the “qua horse” clause. When y is characterized by an absolute
property, you know that you can safely trace the value of y between cases.
What about the sex of the horse in the north paddock? Essential or not? The syn-
tactic ambiguity of the question is well known. Here is how it goes in CIFOL, where,
as in many other treatments, the ambiguity is one of scope illustrating de re vs.
de dicto.
De re, true Necessarily, the occupant of the north paddock is, qua horse, either
essentially56 male or essentially female:
∀x[(Hx ∧ x = ιyNy ∧ Ex) → ((Ex → Mx) ∨ (Ex → Fx))].
You might think that the antecedent forces us to take the intension of x as ∗∗en—
which is indeed the intension of ιyNy; but that’s not an intension falling under the
absolute concept “horse” (as opposed to falling under H(e)). Instead, the antecedent
asks us to consider—case by case—any horse-intension existing in that case and
(extensionally) identical to ∗∗en, which comes down to ∗def (Doris) in case γ3 and
jkln (Jack) in case γ4. And each of these intensions is (extensionally) either male in
all cases in which it exists or female in all cases in which it exists. It figures: CIFOL’s
treatment is exactly right.
56I.e., necessarily-if-existent.
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De dicto, false Necessarily, either the occupant of the north paddock is essentially
male or the occupant of the north paddock is essentially female:
((E( ιyNy) → M( ιyNy)) ∨ (E( ιyNy) → F( ιyNy))).
Here we are looking at only the one intension, ∗∗en. But now the disjunction
comes out false, since that intension is neither male in every case in which it exists,
nor female in every such case. Again, the CIFOL treatment is entirely accurate.
Although it would be possible to present the de re/de dicto contrast in CIFOL
using the Russellian account of definite descriptions, it seems to us that the present
formulation, taking definite descriptions as categorematic in the Frege-Bressan way,
is cleaner and more intuitive.
5.4 Natural Numbers
Bressan [6] shows how one obtains a natural absolute concept, N, of “natural num-
ber” (= non-negative integer) in case-intensional higher-order type theory (MLν), by
verbatim adoption of the usual extensional theory, but using (x = y) in place of
x = y everywhere except in the Peano axiom 0 = n+1 (p. 100), which should retain
its extensional meaning. In this development, each natural number is identified with
an extensional second-order property. For example, the number 2 is identified with
the second-order property of first-order properties of applying to exactly two things
(counting extensionally):
2 =df λP (∃x∃y(x = y ∧ Px ∧ Py ∧ ∀z(P z → (z = x ∨ z = y)))).
In this context, it is more idiomatic to say “class” instead of “property” (observ-
ing that CIFOL, being innocent of metaphysics, does not distinguish the two): The
number 2 is identified with the second-order class of first-order classes that contain
exactly two things; the class 2 will be extensional. The absolute third-order class,
N, of natural numbers is identified with the class containing 0 and all its succes-
sors.57 By this construction, it is only right and proper that the extension of the term
(numeral) “2” in a case, γ , can differ from the extension of “2” in another case, γ ′,
depending on which first-order properties happen to apply to exactly two things in
these cases. So even numerals shouldn’t be “rigid designators” that have the same
extension in every case! What is logically important, is that the third-order property
of being a natural number, N, is absolute, so that we can trace numbers across cases.
Let’s see by example how MSep works for N. For instance, since 1 and 2 each fall
under N, MSep requires, in effect, that there is no possible case in which they agree:
using Mν for a model appropriate for MLν , Mν |= ¬♦(1 = 2). But fortunately it
cannot be that Mν, γ |= 1 = 2 for some γ , for that would require the impossibility
that the class of classes having exactly one member in γ be the same as the class of
classes having exactly two members in γ (counting extensionally).
It seems a shame to apply Bressan’s sophisticated theory of numbers to Quine’s
over-familiar example of the number of planets, but in truth it can’t hurt. Now, in
order to stay within the confines of CIFOL, we suppose that N is brought down to
57We omit details.
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the first order as an absolute property, and that each numeral is brought down to the
first order as a term, n, with the standard Peano properties. Everybody agrees that the
sentence,
The number of planets is necessarily greater than seven,
has two readings, and is true under one and false under the other. The CIFOL anal-
ysis is as follows. We use a term, α, for the definite description, “the number of
planets” (remember from Section 3.1.7 that definite descriptions are just terms, with
an intension and with an extension at each case, so abbreviating the description as a
general term α does not beg any questions). We use a one-place predicate, G, for “is
greater than seven.” In the case at hand, γ , the number of planets is eight (recently
downgraded from nine); in another possible case, γ ′, it is four.
De dicto, false The first reading (“de dicto”), on which the sentence is false, is:
∀x((Nx ∧ x = α) → Gx),
“in every case, if there is a natural number that is the number of planets in that case,
then that that number is greater than seven.” This is false because in case γ ′, the
natural number four is equal to the number of planets, and four is not greater than
seven.
De re, true The second reading (“de re”), on which the sentence comes out true in
case γ (even though false in case γ ′), is:
∀x((Nx ∧ x = α) → Gx),
“for any absolute natural number that is equal to the number of planets in the case at
hand, in every case, that number is greater than seven.” This is true because eight is
greater than seven in any case.
On the de re reading, the absolute concept, N, plays an important role: Given the
case at hand, γ , the extension of α (“the number of planets”) at γ determines a unique
absolute natural number, eight, due to modal separation. There are many individual
intensions that have the same extension-at-γ as α (“Mary’s favorite number” may be
among them), but there is only one absolute natural number-intension among them.
If we change the reading to demand not true natural numbers but only intensions that
are extensionally equal to a natural number in the case at hand, we obtain a reading
on which our sentence is false even in case γ :
∀x((N(e!)x ∧ x = α) → Gx),
“for any intension that is equal to an absolute natural number and that is equal to
the number of planets in the case at hand, in every case, that intension is greater
than seven.” This is false because, for example, the intension of α itself fulfills the
antecedent, but not the consequent. CIFOL delivers the verdict that even the sentence,
The number of planets is a natural number,
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has two readings, under one of which it is false: It is true that N(e!)α, but false
that Nα.58
5.5 Testing Horses for the X Aberration
Next we go through an important kind of application of CIFOL, namely, to an ine-
liminable use of possibility in scientific discourse. (Bressan [6] offers a detailed
argument for the necessity of using possibility and absolute properties in hard
science.)
Horses sometimes have chromosomal aberrations [8]. For some of these there is an
accurate test. We assume that one of these is “the X aberration,” which can always be
revealed by “the X test,” the result of which is stated in terms of an appropriate natural
number, “the X number,” which we may think of as 1 when the horse has the X
aberration and 0 when not. Let us assume that the X test is seldom administered, but it
always can be administered (it’s possible that it is administered) for any extensionally
characterized horse, and it is always accurate. In other words, it is not only possible to
administer the X test to any horse, securing an X number, but in addition any further
possible X test on that horse will give the same X number.
We must use absolute properties for tracing individuals between diverse cases,
such as those encountered in speaking of possible tests. In the example at hand, it is
horses and natural numbers that must be traced. In terms of notation, let X(α, y) be
a predicate meaning that the X test is carried out on α with resulting X number y. So
our existence-and-uniqueness assumption is this, assuming that variables are chosen
so as to avoid conflict:
(%) H (e!)(α) → ∃x[x = α ∧ Ex ∧ Hx ∧
∃y[♦(Ny ∧ Ey ∧ X(x, y)) ∧
∀z[♦(Nz ∧ Ez ∧ X(x, z)) → y = z]]].
“Given any extensionally identified existing horse, α, there is an absolute horse,
x, identical to α, such that it is possible to carry out the X-test on x yielding absolute
numerical result y, and such that every possible X-testing of x yields a numerical
result extensionally identical to y.”59 It is critical that values of each variable be
characterized as falling under some absolute property. In the present example, (%),
we can verify that the values of each of x, y, and z are so characterized.
In order to strengthen our claim to the usefulness of CIFOL, we wish to prove
that, given the absoluteness of H and N, the final case-dependent identity, y = z, can
be raised to a strict identity, (y = z); that is, letting X′(v, w) abbreviate ♦(Nw ∧
Ew ∧ X(v,w)) and letting Y(w) abbreviate w = α ∧ Ew ∧ Hw:
58To repeat, it is the sentence that has two readings, not N. See footnote 51.
59It is obvious that the limitation Ex is needed, since it makes no sense to test a horse, α, at a case in which
α doesn’t exist. On the other hand, Ey and Ez are redundant, assuming the theory of the natural numbers,
N, adumbrated in Section 5.4 according to which they all exist in every case; that is, Exist-imp(N) (see
Definition 12).
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Fact 2 (Raising to a Strict Identity)
(Abs(N) ∧ Abs(H)) →
[H(e!)(α) → [∃x[Yx ∧ ∃y[X′(x, y) ∧ ∀z[X′(x, z) → y = z]]]] →
[H(e!)(α) → [∃x[Yx ∧ ∃y[X′(x, y) ∧ ∀z[X′(x, z) → y = z]]]]]
Proof
1 Abs(H) ∧ Abs(N) hyp
2 (%) hyp
3 H(e!)α hyp
4 x0 = α ∧ Ex0 ∧ Hx0 ∧ ∃y[X′(x0, y)∧
∀z[X′(x0, z) → y = z]] 2,3, choose x0
5 X′(x0, y0) ∧ ∀z[X′(x0, z) → y0 = z] 4, choose y0
6 X′(x0, z0) hyp, choose z0
7 ♦(Ny0 ∧ Ey0 ∧ X(x0, y0)) 5, def
8 ♦(Nz0 ∧ Ez0 ∧ X(x0, z0)) 6, def
9 ♦Ny0 ∧ ♦Nz0 7, 8, S5
10 Ny0 ∧ Nz0 9, 1 (MConst (N))
11 Ny0 ∧ Nz0 10, S5
12 Ey0 ∧ Ez0 11, Exist-imp(N)
13 y0 = z0 5 (z0/z), 6
14 ♦(Ey0 ∧ Ez0 ∧ y0 = z0) 12, 13, S5
15 (y0 = z0) 1, 11, 14 (MSep(N))
16 ∀z[X′(x0, z) → (y0 = z)] 6–15 (z0/z)
17 ∃y[(X′(x0, y) ∧ ∀z[X′(x0, z) → (y = z)]] 5, 16 (y0/y)
18 ∃x[x = α ∧ Ex ∧ Hx ∧ ∃y[X′(x, y)∧
∀z[X′(x, z) → (y = z)]]] 4, 17 (x0/x)
19 H(e!)(α) → ∃x[x = α ∧ Ex ∧ Hx∧
∃y[X′(x, y) ∧ ∀z[X′(x, z) → (y = z)]]] 3–18
20 1 → (2 → 19) 1, 2–19
As promised, line 19 is just like (%), except that y = z is promoted to a strict
identity. It is worth noting how the various simple features of CIFOL work together
to produce this result.
Fact 2 amounts to showing that the result of the testing is invariably intensionally
unique (same individual intension). This in turn would justify a Mach-style definition
of “the X number” of each horse, parallel to the Mach definition of “the mass of body
b” as detailed in [6, §§N18–N23]. As far as we can see, none of the extensionalist first
order quantified modal logics with only extensional predication possesses sufficient
sophistication to handle the argument that is the backbone of the example.60
60Gupta [18] escapes this verdict by building Bressanian tracing via absolute concepts directly into his
quantifier semantics. See Section 1.3 above.
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6 Summary
Let us look back at what has been achieved, and forward to what remains to be
done. In this essay, we argued for ideals of ease of use, uniformity, expressive power,
and usefulness at which a successful combination of modal logic with first order
quantification theory should aim (Section 1). We reviewed several systems on the
market in Section 1.3 and complained that they fail to live up to our ideals largely
because (a) they treat the issue of tracing individuals across cases as a matter of
logic, (b) are thereby forced to rely on choices with detrimental effects on ease of
use and uniformity, and (c) disallow non-extensional predication. We introduced our
system CIFOL, a legitimate descendant of [6], with the express aim and promise
that these problems in combining modality and quantification can be overcome. In
our introduction of the basics of the system in Section 2, we stressed that a key
conceptual ingredient in our approach is to depart from focusing on possible worlds,
and to welcome the broader notion of possible cases. This notion may be given both
a purely modal, a temporal, or a temporal-modal interpretation, or indeed any other
useful interpretation. We stressed in Section 2.5 that this change of perspective on
the underlying possibilities brings with it a liberating change of perspective on the
values of variables. Yes, values of variables can be individuals of the concrete world,
but no, these values are not extensions, but intensions.
In Section 3 we introduced the formal semantic machinery of CIFOL. The main
points are (a) a fully general application of Carnap’s method of extension and inten-
sion, whereby each expression has an extension in each case, and an intension
that is the pattern of extensions across cases, (b) as a result, the uniform semanti-
cal treatment of individual expressions, including definite descriptions, (c) a single,
uniform semantical rule for non-extensional predication which adds expressive
power (Section 3.1.3), and (d) the specific requirement that identity be extensional
(Section 3.1.5). On that basis, a simple treatment of modal operators as quantifiers
over possible cases and of first-order quantification was possible.
Section 3, which constitutes the full definition of the “creative” part of CIFOL as
a logical system, contains no discussion of individuals, substances, “rigid designa-
tors,” “trans-world identity,” sortal terms, or any other issues of modal metaphysics.
While this may on a first view look like a restriction of the usefulness of CIFOL as
a quantified modal logic, in reality it only shows that CIFOL is properly a logic and
not a logic-cum-metaphysics. As far as logic is concerned, it is simply not settled
whether there are any individuals, substances, or kinds. The usefulness of CIFOL is
shown, in our view, by the fact that it includes a simple and general definitional inter-
face that allows for the extra-logical discussion of issues of individuals and the like.
We described this interface in Section 4, in which we introduce the CIFOL-definable
notions of extensional CIFOL quality vs. absolute CIFOL sortal (Definition 14 and
Definition 19, respectively). We illustrated the use of absolute properties for tracing
individuals across cases in Section 5, commenting on the issues of essential proper-
ties, modality de dicto vs. de re, and the testing of individuals for traits. To repeat,
these are extra-logical matters; the fact that they can be successfully and perspicu-
ously discussed in CIFOL, however, is a strong point in favor of the system as an
easy-to-use, uniform, expressively powerful, and useful intensional logic.
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In the present Part I of this essay, we have had recourse to a temporal, or temporal-
modal, interpretation of the set of cases where that seemed appropriate for purposes
of illustration. We have not given a formal theory for the temporal application—the
length of the present essay forces us to defer this discussion to Part II. Briefly, the
issue is as follows. A proper treatment of temporal-modal cases in the formal frame-
work of branching histories [32] brings with it new challenges both of a formal and
of a metaphysical nature. Formally, we will need to generalize the notion of an abso-
lute property in order to deal with possible variations of extensions across different
cases belonging to the same moment in a branching structure. Metaphysically, we
will need to extend the notion of an individual to a branching framework. Many argu-
ments against branching as a representation of real future possibility rely on intuitive,
sketchy complaints about the notion of a “branching individual” and its possible
futures. We believe that the formal framework of CIFOL provides the necessary sta-
ble logical background and formal interface to address these difficult challenges in
Part II. It is certainly worth the effort: A successful formal model of individuals in a
branching framework will make possible a perspicuous formal perspective on what
it is to be like one of us: a proper individual facing a future of real possibilities.
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